Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect people’s willingness to cooperate?

How to cite

Essl, Andrea; Jaussi, Stefanie; Friedrich, Kathrin; Bieberstein, Frauke von. 2019. "Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect people’s willingness to cooperate?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004992. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4992-1.0

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Andrea Essl* , Stefanie Jaussi , Kathrin Friedrich , Frauke von Bieberstein

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004992
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4992-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-06-01 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4992

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we examine whether loss contracts are detrimental to cooperation. In particular, we aim at investigating whether the agent’s experience of a penalty (having to pay back money when not meeting a target) has a negative impact on the willingness to cooperate. In the experiment, participants first perform a real-effort task and then participate in a public goods game. The payment scheme in the real-effort task varies across treatments. More specifically, we implement a gain and a loss contract that are payoff equivalent and only differ in framing. Cooperation is measured as contributions of the agents to a public good.

Intervention

Participants are randomized at the session level to either the gain or the loss treatment. First, participants work on a real-effort task under either a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. Second, participants play a public goods game where two randomly selected individuals form a group.

Experimental design

Lab experiment. Between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the session level to either the gain or the loss treatment. First, participants work on a real-effort task under either a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. Second, participants play a public goods game where two randomly selected individuals form a group. In addition, we elicit individual loss aversion and baseline performance. Finally, participants fill out a non-incentivized questionnaire.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer (lab experiment)
Randomization unit
Experimental session
Clusters
In total about 300 participants
Observations
In total about 300 participants
Arms
About 150 participants per treatment
Primary outcomes
Contributions to the public goods game. In addition, number of tasks solved in the real-effort task. We will control for individual differences as given by the questionnaire.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords