Intelligence and Leadership

How to cite

Pearce, Graeme; Drouvelis, Michalis. 2020. "Intelligence and Leadership." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004988. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4988-1.2000000000000002

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Graeme Pearce* , Michalis Drouvelis

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004988
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4988-1.2000000000000002
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-01-27 – 2020-03-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4988

Abstract

We study how intelligence impacts the decisions of individuals in an infinitely repeated sequential public goods game.

Intervention

We run an experiment in which subjects are divided into High and Low intelligence groups. This is determined by their relative rank in a Raven Test - those above the median are High, and those below, Low. Subjects then play a two player public goods game, repeated indefinitely.

Experimental design

We run an experiment in which subjects are divided into High and Low intelligence groups. This is determined by their relative rank in a Raven Test - those above the median are High, and those below, Low. They then complete a sequential 2 player public goods game, indefinitely repeated (discount rate = 0.75). They play as either the first mover or a second mover.

We have 4 treatments - HH, HL, LH, LL - where HH refers to a 'High First Mover, High Follower' and HL refers to a 'High First Mover, Low Follower'.

Rather than let subjects play the game actively, they specify a plan of action - i.e. we elicit their full strategies. We then match them to someone in the session, and the computer plays out the game.

Plans of action are limited so that subjects strategies can only be conditional on Period t and t-1 actions. As the strategy space is infinitely large, we must enforce some limitations. We do this for both first and second movers, ensuring that they both must make 30 decisions in the experiment.

In addition, we elicit subjects beliefs about the other players contributions in Period 1 ( a point estimate) that is incentivised.

Prior to completing the repeated public goods game, subjects complete (in a random order) tests to elicit social preference type, risk aversion. After the public goods game, we also elicit Personality traits using the Big 5 test.

Design details

Randomization method
random, computer
Randomization unit
individual level
Clusters
session level - 20
Observations
20 session level observations - 200 subjects in total.
Arms
50 subjects per treatment - in each role (approx)
Primary outcomes
1. Strategy Choices 2. Contributions in Period 1 3. Beliefs
Secondary outcomes
1. Personality traits and intelligence 2. Personality traits and strategy choice 3. Personality traits and beliefs

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords