Social Relationships and Need-based Justice
How to cite
Schwaninger, Manuel; Szendrö, Réka; Kittel, Bernhard. 2019. "Social Relationships and Need-based Justice." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004987. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4987-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Contemporary research on distributive justice assumes that close social relationships between individuals are critical for the prevalence of the need principle in a group. While recent empirical studies suggest that needs affect how groups distribute available payoffs, the group members’ social relationship has only been implicitly addressed by assuming that group members have sufficiently close relationships with each other for the need principle to appeal. In this study, we examine whether need satisfaction depends on the social relation between the group members in a controlled, laboratory experiment. By means of a group task, we create social proximity among group members. After the group task stage, participants are systematically matched into groups of three where they bargain over the distribution of a joint, exogenously given endowment. The group composition varies with respect to the proximity of social ties. We hypothesize that group members with closer social proximity are more likely to form coalitions and, therefore, are more likely to satisfy each other’s needs. Evidence supporting the theoretical claim that the adherence to the need principle depends on the type of social relationship, contributes to identifying the scope of need-based justice and systemizing the domains of different distributive justice norms.
Intervention
Between groups: Groups are systematically matched to vary the social distance between group members according to induced social relations.
Within groups: Artificial need thresholds are varied within constant groups over several rounds.
Experimental design
We conduct an anonymous, computerized laboratory experiment with 3 stages.
In stage 1, we induce close (i.e. relatively closer) social relationships through an incentivized, cooperative task played in groups of three. In the control group participants play a single player version of the same task.
In stage 2, the participants are systematically matched into new groups of three and are able to negotiate (in terms of numbers) in private with the two other players over the distribution of fixed payoffs in an incentivized, unstructured bargaining game. We match according to a between-subject treatment design:
- In the control treatment, groups in stage 2 consist of three participants who played the previous task individually.
- In treatment 1, groups in stage 2 consist of three participants who played the previous task in three different groups.
- In treatment 2, groups in stage 2 consist of three participants of which two played the previous task in the same and one in a different group.
- In treatment 3, groups in stage 2 consist of three participants who played the previous task in the same group.
In stage 3, the participants play a real-effort task. The task is only payoff relevant if the payoff obtained in stage 2 is equal or exceeds an individually assigned threshold (need). We explain the meaning and consequences of the thresholds before stage 2. The assigned thresholds of all group members are common knowledge during stage 2.
Design details
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