Endogenous and exogenous reputation in the one-shot, sequential prisoner dilemma.

How to cite

Suchon, Rémi; Lenaerts, Tom; Kirchsteiger, Georg. 2019. "Endogenous and exogenous reputation in the one-shot, sequential prisoner dilemma.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004937. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4937-1.1

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Rémi Suchon* , Tom Lenaerts , Georg Kirchsteiger

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004937
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4937-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-11-07 – 2020-05-05
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4937

Abstract

The aim of the experiment is to test the effectiveness of reputation mechanisms to promote cooperation in one-shot, anonymous interactions.
In a sequential prisoner dilemma, we vary whether past behavior of the second mover is disclosed to the first mover. We also vary whether the disclosure is exogenous or endogenous (i.e. a choice by the second mover).

Intervention

We experimentally study the impact of different types of reputation on cooperation in a one shot, (modified) sequential prisoner dilemma.
We focus on the reputation of the second mover. Between conditions, we vary whether the reputation is noisy and whether its disclosure is endogenous, i.e. chosen by the second mover.

Experimental design

We experimentally study the impact of reputation on cooperation in a one shot, modified sequential prisoner dilemma. We modify the prisoner dilemma by allowing the first mover to opt-out of the interaction, and secure instead a sure amount.

In each session, participants play the sequential prisoner dilemma for 30 rounds. Roles ("first mover" and "second mover") are fixed. We rematch participants randomly between each rounds.

In total, we plan to run 7 experimental conditions:

We implement a condition in which no reputation mechanism is implemented. We use it to establish a baseline level of cooperation.

In addition, we implement a 2 by 3 between-subjects factorial design:

1- In the first dimension, we vary whether the disclosure of information about the past choices of the second mover is disclosed exogenously or endogenously to the first mover. In the "exogenous" conditions, the disclosure of information about the past choices of the second mover is totally exogenous. In the "endogenous" conditions, the second mover decides whether he wants to disclose information about his past choices.

2- In the second dimension, we vary the noisiness of reputation. In the exogenous reputation conditions, noise is introduced by means of a probability that the information about the past choices of the second mover is disclosed. In the endogenous reputation conditions, noise is introduced by means of a probability that the information about the past choices of the second mover is disclosed conditional on the choice of the second mover to disclose this information. There are three levels of noise: no noise (the probability on disclosure is one), low noise (the probability of disclosure is 90%) and high noise (the probability of disclosure is 60%).

Design details

Randomization method
Computer randomization.
Randomization unit
Conditions are implemented at the session level.
Clusters
420 individuals in total, 210 in each role.
Observations
12600 observations in total (30 rounds * 420 individuals), 6300 in each role (30 rounds * 210 individuals).
Arms
21 sessions (three in each condition). In each condition, 30 individuals in each role.
Primary outcomes
The main variables of interest are: The level of cooperation, by both first and second movers. The decision of first movers to enter into the prisoner dilemma. The decision of second movers to disclose information about their past choices.

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Keywords