Effective mechanisms to resolve resource allocation problems
How to cite
Rusch, Hannes; Morath, Florian; Glowacki, Luke. 2019. "Effective mechanisms to resolve resource allocation problems." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004847. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4847-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We analyze factors that explain the success of democratic institutions as a means to solve resource allocation problems. Our lab-in-the-field experiment investigates the following questions: Can democratic allocation mechanisms effectively resolve distributional conflict in the presence of ancient hostilities between groups? Does the risk of being exploited by the majority induce the minority to reject democratic allocation institutions and trigger inefficient conflict? Do restrictions of the majority's decision-making power resolve the distributional conflict and increase the success of democratic allocation institutions?
Our experiment is based on a game theoretic model in which two groups of unequal size decide whether to implement a given democratic allocation mechanism or to choose conflict before they observe the outcome of the allocation mechanism. Our main experimental variations address the impact of ethnic hostilities on the likelihood of conflict as well as the role of the--explicit and implicit--decision-making power of the majority. For the former, we compare the success of democratic institutions in the presence versus absence of ancient hostilities. For the latter, we compare two variants that make the political institutions more ‘inclusive’: (a) a change in the voting rule that strengthens the minority in the democratic allocation mechanism; and (b) the threat of triggering conflict as an implicit option to exert veto power in case of too unequal democratic resource allocations.
Intervention
Our baseline treatment (“MAJ-DIFF”) implements majority voting as the mechanism to decide on the allocation in case the groups do not opt for conflict. The two groups are recruited from different ethnicities. As the first variation, the same game is played among individuals from the same ethnic group (treatment “MAJ-SAME”). As second and third manipulations, we change (a) the voting rule (treatment “PR-DIFF”) and (b) the timing of the game (treatment “MAJ-VETO”). In PR-DIFF we give each individual the same chance to decide the allocation outcome (as with a random dictator rule). In MAJ-VETO we change the sequence of actions, such that individuals can decide on conflict conditional on the outcome of the democratic allocation institution.
Experimental design
Our baseline treatment (“MAJ-DIFF”) implements majority voting as the mechanism to decide on the allocation in case the groups do not opt for conflict. The two groups are recruited from different ethnicities. As the first variation, the same game is played among individuals from the same ethnic group (treatment “MAJ-SAME”). As second and third manipulations, we change (a) the voting rule (treatment “PR-DIFF”) and (b) the timing of the game (treatment “MAJ-VETO”). In PR-DIFF we give each individual the same chance to decide the allocation outcome (as with a random dictator rule). In MAJ-VETO we change the sequence of actions, such that individuals can decide on conflict conditional on the outcome of the democratic allocation institution.
Design details
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