Experiment on Tax Compliance in Eswatini

How to cite

Santoro, Fabrizio. 2019. "Experiment on Tax Compliance in Eswatini." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004753. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4753-1.0

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Fabrizio Santoro*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004753
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4753-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-10-07 – 2019-12-16
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4753

Abstract

Tax to GDP ratio in developing countries is still remarkably low. One of the key factors behind poor tax collection is low tax compliance. This study aims to test, using a randomized controlled trial, the effect of a multi-faceted nudging strategy from the Eswatini Revenue Authority (SRA), targeting the whole population of income taxpayers in Eswatini, or about 39,000 units. The innovations of this study are manifold. First, it fills the gap in knowledge about which revenue mobilising strategies are more effective in contexts of limited infrastructural capacity as in Sub-Saharan Africa. Very little robust tax research has been carried out in Africa, often limited in scope and targeting a subgroup of the whole taxpayer population. In this case, the SRA will target the whole population of taxpayers, divided into three specific compliance categories: active, non-filers and nil-filers; and in two taxpayer types: corporate vis à vis individual. Second, the content of the nudges, which is derived from the recent findings of behavioural public finance, is not the same for everyone but adapted to each subgroup. Third, detailed survey data will be collected for a subsample of 1,000 taxpayers in order to gain richer information, going beyond what we observe from the SRA administrative data, and explore the mechanisms through which tax compliance takes place. Survey data will be matched with administrative data in a novel way, whereas most of the nudging literature just adopts official tax returns.

The final goal is to provide robust experimental evidence on the alternative forces that drive taxpayers to comply as well as to pilot an innovative, and plausibly cost-effective, strategy of tailored communication between tax authority and taxpayers fostering compliance. If proved to be effective, behavioural nudges can be included as an additional element in the policy toolkit of SRA and complement the existing traditional strategies to mobilise revenues, such as audits or fiscal reforms.

Experimental design

A randomized controlled trial (RCT) will be set up in order to gauge causal impacts. The inherent advantages of an RCT is to make sure that the experimental groups are draw at random, and are well balanced on observable characteristics, such that any difference arising between them can be attributed to the intervention.

Assignment to a given nudging group will be random, as well as the assignment to the survey sample.

Design details

Randomization method
The assignment of the treatment status (see 3.3) will be done using STATA. The following guidelines will be followed: • Randomization will take place separately for CIT and PIT payers and for each of the 3 taxpayer types • A seed will be set in STATA so that the code is replicable • Randomization will be done using the following strata: o Region: 4 strata o Old versus newly registered taxpayers (dummy): 2 strata o Size (dummy): top 10% dummy based on turnover declared in the previous year if the taxpayer already declared, or on the estimated turnover reported at registration for newly registered taxpayers: 2 strata o Individual taxpayer type (dummy, for PIT only): sole trader vs director of company • Ideally, I plan to check for balance after randomization and re-run the codes multiple times until the highest balance is achieved The survey sample in Table 2 will be derived using the same randomization protocol.
Randomization unit
Individual taxpayers
Clusters
0.
Observations
39,000 individual taxpayers for the nudge experiment, plus 1,000 individual taxpayers to be assigned to the survey sample.
Arms
Drawing from the study sample figures in 3.1.2, the sample will be randomly allocated in the following way (also see Appendix Table A2 for a better display of the treatment groups): • Active: o CIT: T1 1026 - T2 422 - T3 1027 - C of T1 and T3 1,041 + C of T2 477 o PIT: T1 2,552 - T3 2,553 - C 2,571 (T2 not available here) • Nil-filers: o CIT: T1 449 - T2 451 - C 454 o PIT: T1 716 - T2 715 - C 734 • Non-filers: o CIT: T1 1,055 – T4 1,056 – T5 1,055 – C 1,065 o PIT: T1 1,382 – T2 1,382 – T3 1,377 – T4 1,377 – T5 1,370 – C 14,255
Primary outcomes
For active taxpayers: • Probability to declare more than previous year • Amount of tax declared on top of what declared previous year • Relative percentage increase in amount declared • Probability to amend previous year’s declaration + amount + % share • Probability to register additional tax types For nil-filers: • Probability to declare a positive amount and switch to active filing • Amount of tax declared • Probability to be below the threshold of taxable income and still pay zero taxes (tax avoidance) • Probability to amend previous year’s declaration + amount + % share • Probability to de-register from SRA For non-filers: • Probability to file a tax return • Amount of tax declared • Probability to be below the threshold of taxable income and still pay zero taxes (tax avoidance) • Probability to file declarations for previous year(s) + amount • Probability to de-register from SRA
Secondary outcomes
Additional outcomes from administrative data (N=39,000): • Spillovers on VAT declaration • Increase in costs/deductions/allowances reported as opposed to more income reported (tax avoidance) • Taxpayers’ reaction: contacting the SRA call center/taxpayer hot line • Increased e-tax registration Additional outcomes from survey data (N=1,000): • Change in tax morale • Change in perception of enforcement • Change in tax knowledge (tax law, fines, penalties) • Change in trust towards actors

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Keywords