Discrimination in Hiring and Anonymous CVs in France (CV Anonymes)
How to cite
Crepon, Bruno; Behaghel, Luc; Barbanchon, Thomas le. 2015. "Discrimination in Hiring and Anonymous CVs in France (CV Anonymes)." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000473. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.473-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.
Intervention
In collaboration with the French employment agency Pôle Emploi, researchers evaluated whether making resumes anonymous can actually reduce discrimination. Recruiting firms working with Pôle Emploi to find employees were asked to participate in the experiment, and those who agreed were randomly allocated into a treatment and a comparison group. In the treatment group, resumes coming from the employment agency were made anonymous by removing both the candidates name and address. In the comparison group, resumes coming from the employment agency included this information. It is important to note that in both treatment and comparison groups, employers were receiving resumes from other sources than Pôle Emploi.
There were 385 control and 366 treatment firms that participated in the experimental program and went through the randomization. In addition, 254 firms accepted the program but were not randomly assigned to treatment or control; they canceled or filled the job opening before a first pool of résumés was collected and randomization could take place.
Experimental design
Researchers collected information on the hiring outcomes of 1,000 job offers that had been randomly assigned to the treatment and comparison group, as well as the job offers that had been made. They also examined hiring practices among employers who refused to take part in the experiment, and some who had not been asked to participate. Recruiters, and a random sample of candidates, were also administered a survey by phone.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Behaghel, Luc, Bruno Crépon, and Thomas Le Barbanchon. 2015. "Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(3): 1-27. http://www.povertyactionlab.org/publication/unintended-effects-anonymous-resumes
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