An Experimental Evaluation of a Matching Market Mechanism

How to cite

Jones, Damon; Kerkebane, Nina; Davis, Jonathan; Greengberg, Kyle. 2019. "An Experimental Evaluation of a Matching Market Mechanism." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004718. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4718-3.0

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Damon Jones* , Nina Kerkebane , Jonathan Davis , Kyle Greengberg

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004718
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4718-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2019-10-02 – 2024-03-01
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D82, M5, J4
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4718

Abstract

We propose using a randomized controlled trial to measure the impact of replacing a status quo job assignment process within a large-scale employer with a system based on insights from matching and market design on match outcomes, in particular, using a deferred acceptance algorithm to match employees with positions.

Intervention

We propose replacing the current system of manually matching employees to positions with an algorithmic match based on the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Experimental design

We will test the impact of matching via the deferred acceptance algorithm using a randomized controlled trial.

Design details

Randomization method
We will use a pseudo-random number generator to assign markets to the treatment or control group within pre-determined randomization blocks. Any markets that are considered unsuitable candidates for the treatment before randomization will be excluded from the randomization and analysis.
Randomization unit
Market of employees and positions within the firm, based on rank in the organization and specialty.
Clusters
120 markets
Observations
11,500 employees
Arms
60 treatment and 60 control markets
Primary outcomes
Our main outcomes are (1) self-reported preference manipulation, (2) satisfaction with the match based on preference reports, (3) performance in the match, and (4) retention in the match and with the Army.
Secondary outcomes
There is a possibility that we will be able measure additional measures of match-relevant outcomes for the family, including fertility decisions, marriage and divorce rates, and measures of spousal volunteerism.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords