Changing Harmful Norms through Information and Coordination: Experimental Evidence from Somalia

How to cite

Gulesci, Selim; Ferrara, Eliana La; Smerdon, David; Sulaiman, Munshi. 2019. "Changing Harmful Norms through Information and Coordination: Experimental Evidence from Somalia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004693. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4693-1.1

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Selim Gulesci* , Eliana La Ferrara , David Smerdon , Munshi Sulaiman

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004693
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4693-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2018-11-01 – 2020-05-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4693

Abstract

FGC is the practice of cutting or removing part of the external or internal female genitalia for non-medical reasons. FGC is a harmful practice along several dimensions. First, it leads to serious health consequences, both at the time of cutting (e.g., excessive bleeding and increased mortality) and in the long run (e.g., birth-related complications). Second, FGC is associated with lower educational achievement of girls because girls are often pulled out of school after the practice, either due to health complications or because they are seen as having “transitioned” to adulthood. Third, given that FGC is generally performed on young girls without their consent, it is a human rights violation.

There can be several explanations for why a harmful practice, such as FGC, may continue being practised. In this project, we aim to test for two of these explanations. First, FGC is often viewed as the result of a coordination failure. In a setting where individual choices are interdependent, multiple equilibria may exist and one reason for the persistence of bad norms can be a failure to coordinate to the “better” equilibrium. Individuals may know that others do not like FGC but no single individual may want to move unilaterally due to fear of social sanctions. To the extent that individuals worry about social stigma, they may even be hesitant to reveal their private views on FGC to others. Second, individuals may privately dislike FGC but think that others do and therefore they continue doing it. Social psychologists describe as pluralistic ignorance a setting in which a majority of the group privately want to change their behavior, but mistakenly think that the majority of the other group members prefer to keep the existing behavior.

In this project, we aim to test to what extent these two potential reasons may explain why FGC persists in Somalia. In particular, our experiment entails two key components: one directed at providing information (hence correcting misperceptions) by enabling the truthful revelation of attitudes towards FGC; and one directed at providing a coordination device that will facilitate collective action among those who privately support the abandonment of FGM.

Experimental design

We randomize the communities in our sample into four groups in order to test the hypotheses explained above. Below we summarize the different treatment groups:
Control: Poll only.
Treatment 1: Poll + Announcement of the result of the poll.
Treatment 2: Poll + Coordination exercise.
Treatment 3: Poll + Announcement of the result of the poll + Coordination exercise.

To identify the effects of the intervention, we will compare the outcomes of interest between treatment and control samples at follow-up survey(s). Due to the randomized design, these differences can be interpreted as causal impacts. In particular, by comparing the outcomes of interest in T1 vs C, we will test if the truthful revelation of community preferences affects individuals’ outcomes; this constitutes a direct test of the pluralistic ignorance mechanism for the continuation of FGC. The comparison of the outcomes of interest in T2 vs C allows us to shed light on whether the coordination mechanism alone can be an effective way for community members to coordinate to a new equilibrium. By comparing outcomes in T3 vs C relative to T1 vs C, we will test whether there are synergies between information provision and the availability of a coordination mechanism. Community members may not be able to shift to a new equilibrium even in the presence of new information. The experimental design allows us to test the joint effect of these mechanisms by comparing outcomes in T3 vs C relative to T1 vs C.

The effect that the revelation of communities’ true preferences will have on individuals is likely to differ depending on the ex-ante expectations of each subject regarding the share of community members in favor of FGC. In a Bayesian updating framework, individuals whose prior was lower than the realized share should revise their expectations upwards, and vice versa. We will be able to test for this effect using our baseline survey that elicits individuals’ beliefs regarding the attitudes of others and by testing the heterogeneity of the impact along this dimension.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Community.
Clusters
We will survey a representative sample of community members who participated in the meetings in 141 communities.
Observations
The sample includes 4230 households, equally split by gender (15 men and 15 women in each community).
Arms
Control (35 communities): Poll only. Treatment 1 (36 communities): Poll + Announcement of the result of the poll. Treatment 2 (34 communities): Poll + Coordination exercise. Treatment 3 (36 communities): Poll + Announcement of the result of the poll + Coordination exercise.
Primary outcomes
1. Attitudes towards FGC 2. Prevalence of FGC
Secondary outcomes
Perceived costs and benefits" of FGC

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Keywords