Incentives and Culture: Evidence from a Multi-Country Field Experiment
How to cite
Bandiera, Oriana; Fischer, Greg; Dahlstrand-Rudin, Amanda. 2019. "Incentives and Culture: Evidence from a Multi-Country Field Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004685. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4685-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Motivated by the correlation between culture and incentive pay across countries, we test the hypothesis that incentive pay is more effective in individualistic cultures. To do so, we establish identical data entry firms to create experimental variation in pay packages in three countries that have similar GDP per capita but different level of individualism: Ghana, India and the Philippines. The effect of performance pay on log productivity is lowest in the least individualistic country (Ghana) and highest in the most individualistic country (India), with the Philippines falling in between. In line with the culture hypothesis, publicising individual ranks is effective in India but backfires in the Philippines.
Intervention
We founded model data entry firms in three countries with different culture but fairly similar GDP per capita. In all three countries we implemented three classic pay packages: our control group received fixed wages, whilst treatment is divided into individual incentives (paid by keystroke per hour) and group incentives (paid by the average keystrokes per hour in a group of four). To shut down income effects we set the piece rates so that a worker with median productivity is expected to earn the same. Finally, we generate exogenous variation in the visibility of individual reqards by cross-randomising both treatments with the publication of performance rankings.
Experimental design
From an experimental perspective, choosing Ghana, India and the Philippines allowed us to explore a variety of countries as measured by their Hofstede scores for individualism. According to Geert Hofstede’s measures of Individualism, Ghana scores a 15, near the bottom of the Hofstede measures for Individualism, while India scores a 48 in the middle of the field and the Philippines a 32. In the course of the experiment, we interact country-level individualism with the incentive contracts.
We ran two two-day contracts per week over the course of a year and a half, with an experimental duration of ten months, one year and nine months in Ghana, India and the Philippines, respectively. To avoid spillovers, all workers in a given two-day contract received the same contract (i.e. all workers in the office at a given time received flat wage or IPR). We provide these workers with a written contract to sign that laid out the contract terms. Following the brief orientation, we assigned workers to one of ten workstations and the on-site manager gave a fifteen-minute Power Point training. By using a Power Point presentation to train workers, we eliminated variations in training quality that could have occurred over the course of the experiment.
The data entry interfaces captured the total number of key strokes entered by workers over the course of the two-day contract. In addition, the data entry interface captured key timing variables, including the daily start time, end time and the number of seconds to complete one survey. At the end of the two-day contract, the on-site manager paid workers in cash. For workers under the flat wage contract, we did not carry out a salary calculation, and paid each worker a cash wage of 50 GHC, 500 INR or 900 PhP. For the five incentive contracts, the on-site manager collected all data entered by the workers and calculated their pay using based on the conditions of the workers’ assigned contracts. Workers received cash along with a receipt stating the number of key strokes entered and the calculation used to define their two-day wage.
Design details
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