Shutting down social preferences in the lab: an experimenter demand approach

How to cite

Semb, Joakim. 2019. "Shutting down social preferences in the lab: an experimenter demand approach." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004647. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4647-1.1

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Joakim Semb*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004647
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4647-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-09-02 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Sweden ()
JEL codes
A13, C91, D91, C72
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4647

Abstract

Social preferences pose a challenge for any lab testing of theoretical predictions that are based on unobservable vNM utilities. Depending on the theory being tested, the unobservable mapping of laboratory payoffs to vNM utilities will, at best, introduce considerable noise, and at worst, bias the results. I investigate the efficacy of a very straightforward method for reducing the influence of social preferences on decision-making in the lab: instructing subjects to behave selfishly. The question is a simple one: does maximization of one's own payoff better predict subjects' behavior in experiments when they are explicitly instructed to achieve this goal?
To answer this, a first experiment will be conducted in which subjects play a one-shot prisoner's dilemma with one of three treatments: (1) social framing of actions, (2) neutral framing of actions, and (3) neutral framing of actions with explicit instructions to behave selfishly.

Experimental design

Pen-and-paper experiment in which subjects play a one-shot prisoner's dilemma with one of three treatments: (1) social framing of actions, (2) neutral framing of actions, and (3) neutral framing of actions with explicit instructions to behave selfishly (see enclosed instructions for exact phrasing). After choosing their own action, subjects state their beliefs about the distribution of actions among other participants. Payment is based on payoff in the PD and on the accuracy of beliefs.

Subjects also answer an exit survey composed mainly of likert scale items about motives behind action choice.

Design details

Randomization method
Envelopes ordered randomly
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
250-300 students
Observations
250-300 students
Arms
83-100 students in each treatment arm
Primary outcomes
Degree of cooperation in PD Beliefs about opponent cooperation in PD
Secondary outcomes
Survey questions designed to distinguish between types of motives (see separate file for minor hypotheses)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords