Embezzlement and taxation: Experimental evidence
How to cite
Sjursen, Ingrid Hoem; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Putterman, Louis. 2020. "Embezzlement and taxation: Experimental evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004646. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4646-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We provide causal evidence on how two institutional features, source of revenue (tax vs. windfall) and whether the affected party can punish, affect embezzlement.
Intervention
In the experimental treatments, we exogenously vary whether the public revenue is a windfall or is collected as a tax on earnings from a real effort task. Additionally, we vary whether the parties affected by the embezzlement can demand accountability from the person embezzling public revenue (by implementing a costly punishment).
Experimental design
Participants interact in groups of three, where one participant has the role of public official and two participants have the role of citizens. In the interaction, there is some public revenue, the purpose of which is to benefi t the two citizens. The public official is in charge of investing the public revenue in a public project that benefi ts the citizens, but has the power to keep some for him or herself.
In the experimental treatments, we exogenously vary whether the public revenue is a windfall or is collected as a tax on earnings from a real effort task. Additionally, we vary whether the parties affected by the embezzlement can demand accountability from the person embezzling public revenue (by implementing a costly punishment).
Design details
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