Embezzlement and taxation: Experimental evidence

How to cite

Sjursen, Ingrid Hoem; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Putterman, Louis. 2020. "Embezzlement and taxation: Experimental evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004646. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4646-1.1

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Ingrid Hoem Sjursen* , Jean-Robert Tyran , Louis Putterman

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004646
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4646-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-02-19 – 2020-03-30
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4646

Abstract

We provide causal evidence on how two institutional features, source of revenue (tax vs. windfall) and whether the affected party can punish, affect embezzlement.

Intervention

In the experimental treatments, we exogenously vary whether the public revenue is a windfall or is collected as a tax on earnings from a real effort task. Additionally, we vary whether the parties affected by the embezzlement can demand accountability from the person embezzling public revenue (by implementing a costly punishment).

Experimental design

Participants interact in groups of three, where one participant has the role of public official and two participants have the role of citizens. In the interaction, there is some public revenue, the purpose of which is to benefi t the two citizens. The public official is in charge of investing the public revenue in a public project that benefi ts the citizens, but has the power to keep some for him or herself.

In the experimental treatments, we exogenously vary whether the public revenue is a windfall or is collected as a tax on earnings from a real effort task. Additionally, we vary whether the parties affected by the embezzlement can demand accountability from the person embezzling public revenue (by implementing a costly punishment).

Design details

Randomization method
Computer (Qualtrics software)
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
1600 groups (consisting of three individuals)
Observations
4800 individuals, 1600 groups
Arms
1600 individuals (400 groups) in each of the four treatments
Primary outcomes
1. Embezzlement: Share of public revenue the public official does not invest in the public project. 2. Punishment: Minimum acceptable investment: highest share of public revenue allocated to the citizens for which the citizen does not punish the public official.
Secondary outcomes
1. Beliefs about punishment: Highest share of public revenue allocated to the citizens for which public officials believe that the (randomly selected) citizens are willing to punish them. 2. Social norm for embezzlement: Guess about other participant's judgement of five possible investment decisions the public official could make. 3. Beliefs about embezzlement: Citizen's guess about the public official's embezzlement.

Cited by

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Keywords