Contract Design and Insurance Demand
How to cite
Cai, Jing. 2019. "Contract Design and Insurance Demand." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004641. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4641-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This paper uses data from a randomized experiment with around 1700 households in rural China to study the effect on insurance take-up of offering a menu of insurance contracts rather than a single one. Surprisingly, I find that offering more choices increases the take-up rate of the basic contract (lowest premium and payout) by 30%, while only a small proportion of farmers choose contracts with higher premiums and payouts. Information inference explanation is ruled out by the fact that the effect holds even when all farmers are aware of the existence of all contracts. A policy implication is that strategically offering a menu of contracts can be an easy and cheap way to improve insurance take-up.
Experimental design
I use a two-year randomized experiment to identify the role of contract design in influencing insurance demand. The experimental site includes 38 randomly selected villages in Jiangxi Province with around 1800 households. The first year experiment was carried out in Spring 2010, including 13 villages with around 560 households. The main intervention is to randomize the menu of insurance contracts offered to farmers. The first year data is used to test the impact of offering different menus of contracts on insurance take-up. The second year experiment was implemented in Spring 2011, with a different set of 25 villages (around 1200 households), in order to identify two different mechanisms of the contract effect: a context effect and an information effect. The second year design includes a 4 by 2 randomizations to identify different mechanisms of the contract effect. First, I randomize four types of contract menus on the household level. In those menus, contracts differ in the level of insurance premium, government subsidy, and maximum payouts. The second randomization is an information treatment. Within each of the four contract groups, half of the households were provided with two additional pieces of information, including the existence of other contracts and the real probability of disasters.
Design details
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