Pay for applications

How to cite

Vecci, Joe; Ip, Edwin; Feld, Jan; Leibbrandt, Andreas. 2019. "Pay for applications." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004625. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4625-1.0

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Joe Vecci* , Edwin Ip , Jan Feld , Andreas Leibbrandt

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004625
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4625-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-09-02 – 2020-01-15
Countries
Private
JEL codes
J71, C93
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4625

Abstract

In this project, we study whether the competitive nature of the job application process disadvantages certain applicants in a field experiment where a programmer is recruited after completing an assessment task

Experimental design

In the experiment there will be a control and treatment randomly assigned in order to test potential instruments that aim to reduce gender differences in STEM fields.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be carried out by a computer.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit will be the individual applicant for all treatments.
Clusters
The number of clusters will equal the number of observations.
Observations
We aim to invite 720 applicants (360 male and 360 female), which would give us a maximum number of 720 observations (of these invited applicants, only a subset will complete the assessment test). The actual number of invited applicants depends on the number and gender of applicants.
Arms
We aim to have 360 applicants in each treatment group: • Control: 360 applicants (180 male and 180 female) • Incentive: 360 applicants (180 male and 180 female)
Primary outcomes
Key outcome variables include: The number of applicants (men and women) that complete their assessment tasks in the different treatments. Assessment task scores (men and women) in the different treatments. The quality of the applicants that complete their assessment tasks in the different treatments. Gender difference in the effect that monetary incentive has on the quantity and quality of the applications. The number of women reaching shortlisting criteria (e.g. top 25% score in the assessment test score) in the different treatments.
Secondary outcomes
We will test whether the effect of the incentives depend on candidates’ risk aversion and competitiveness. We will also interact treatments with aptitude and personality test performance

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Keywords