Morals in multi-unit markets

How to cite

Ziegler, Andreas; Offerman, Theo; Romagnoli, Giorgia. 2019. "Morals in multi-unit markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004603. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4603-1.3

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Andreas Ziegler* , Theo Offerman , Giorgia Romagnoli

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004603
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4603-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-09-15 – 2020-10-05
Countries
Netherlands (Amsterdam)
JEL codes
C91, C92, D62
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4603

Abstract

The result that markets erode morals (Falk & Szech, 2013) has recently been challenged (for instance by Bartling et al., 2019). Recent experiments on norm erosion restrict market participants to trade at most one unit. This choice might limit the extent to which market forces facilitate selfish behavior and outcomes. In this project, we study markets with multi-unit trading. We establish whether the moral concerns of traders are reflected in market outcomes to the degree that is theoretically predicted and whether there is norm erosion in markets by comparing valuations of a charity donation in individual decision-making to the valuations in markets with single and multi-unit trading.

Experimental design

We run four treatments: IDM, SINGLE, MULTI and FULL. SINGLE, MULTI and FULL are three types of markets, where the total number of tradeable units change (5 in SINGLE, 15 in MULTI and FULL), as well as the maximum number of tradeable units per trader (1 in SINGLE, 3 in MULTI and 15 in FULL).

Design details

Randomization method
Computerized randomization.
Randomization unit
Subjects are first randomly allocated to one of the market treatments or the individual-decision making (computerized). For market treatments, subjects are then randomly allocated to a group (computerized), and subsequently each group is assigned a treatment.
Clusters
10 groups with 10 subjects each per market treatment. No clustering in individual decision making.
Observations
380 subjects
Arms
For the three market treatments (SINGLE, MULTI, FULL), we aim for 10 groups with 10 subjects each (3*10*10=300 subjects). For IDM, we aim for 80 subjects (for this treatment, each subject provides one independent observation). If we run out of subjects before we reach these targets, we will collect as many observations as we can.
Primary outcomes
There are two main outcome dimensions in this experiment: • Individual valuations of a charity donation, directly elicited from participants in individual choices or inferred from bid and ask prices and accepted offers in markets. In these markets, trading produces an externality by reducing donations to a charity. • Traded quantities in the markets.
Secondary outcomes
We compare social norms about appropriative behavior in- and outside of markets and subjects' beliefs about the median valuation of the donation between treatments.

Cited by

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Keywords