A lab-in-field experiment on land trade complexity and market centralization

How to cite

Quidt, Jonathan de; Bryan, Gharad; Wilkening, Tom; Vargas, Mariajose Silva. 2019. "A lab-in-field experiment on land trade complexity and market centralization." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004581. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4581-3.0

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Jonathan de Quidt* , Gharad Bryan , Tom Wilkening , Mariajose Silva Vargas

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004581
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4581-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-08-18 – 2021-08-31
Countries
Uganda (Masaka)
JEL codes
D47, C93, O13, Q15
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4581

Abstract

We study the effects of complexity and market centralization in a land trading game. The game involves groups of 18 participants in villages in Masaka, Uganda. Participants are endowed with game currency and a set of artificial land plots on a "map", and trade plots among themselves to earn returns. They earn returns if they improve the efficiency of the land allocation in the game, which can be achieved by sorting higher "ability" players to better plots and/or by consolidating fragmented plots into contiguous blocks.

Our treatment variations are
1. Map complexity: some maps are "simple" because there are many possible payoff-equivalent first-best allocations of plots. Some maps are "complex" because there are only a few. Complexity is varied by minimally altering maps to add non-trading plots. These decrease the number of possible ways to arrange contiguous blocks of plots into the map.

2. Trade centralization: trade is either "decentralized," with participants trading free-form among themselves within the village, or "centralized," taking place with all participants present in the same location at the same time.

We will study the effects of these treatments on trading efficiency, measured by the share of possible gains from trade achieved in the game, and the distribution of those gains, measured by the log-utility Atkinson index of final payoffs.

Experimental design

We play a series of land trading games, in villages, over the course of 2 weeks and three meetings. The games involve trading artificial land titles, which correspond to plots on a generated "map." Participants trade amongst themselves using game currency, and earn returns according to the gains from trade they achieve. Gains from trade can be achieved by sorting higher "ability" players onto better land, and consolidating fragmented plots into contiguous blocks. Trade is done in free-form bargaining between players. Maps can be either "simple" or "complex" and trade can be "decentralized" or "centralized."

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Village and week. Each village will play either a simple map in week 1 and a complex map in week 2, or complex in week 1 and simple in week 2. At the end of week 2 trade, all villages play a "trading day"
Clusters
68 villages Each village plays a simple map followed by a complex map, or a complex map followed by a simple map. The second week's game is also followed by a trading day.
Observations
204 in total. 3 observations per village: a week 1 trading efficiency outcome, a week 2 pre-trading day efficiency outcome, and a week 2 post-trading day efficiency outcome.
Arms
All villages play the simple treatment once and the complex treatment once, so 68 simple and 68 complex. The trading day is played at the end of week 2, so we will have 34 observations for simple post-trading day and 34 for complex post-trading day.
Primary outcomes
Overall trading efficiency. Trading efficiency broken down into a) Trading efficiency due to defragmentation, b) Trading efficiency due to sorting, c) Trading efficiency due to exposure losses Distribution of final payoffs measured by the log-utility Atkinson index.

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Keywords