Moral nudges and financial advice

How to cite

Weitzel, Utz; Kirchler, Michael. 2019. "Moral nudges and financial advice." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004533. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4533-3.0

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Utz Weitzel* , Michael Kirchler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004533
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4533-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-08-12 – 2020-07-31
Countries
Netherlands ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4533

Abstract

We investigate whether moral nudges influence behavior of bank employees in financial credence goods situations. Usually, bank customers seek financial advice because they do not have sufficient information about complex financial products. This asymmetric information makes the market for financial advice a credence good market (Darby and Karni, 1973) – i.e., even after consumption customers cannot judge whether the “treatment” of the service was appropriate or not. Although there is vast literature focusing on asymmetric information and especially its relevance for advisers’ incentives, there is only little research on how the credence goods properties affect financial advisers’ behavior. Therefore, in this study, we analyze whether and how nudging employees with questions about the moral dimension of financial advice and/or ethical reminders influence their ethical behavior in their financial advice to clients.

Intervention

In Treatment 1, the banker’s oath is mentioned before asking financial advice on an ethical financial dilemma. In Treatment 2, an ethical reminder that is unrelated to the banker’s oath is mentioned before asking advice for the same ethical dilemma. In the control treatment, neither the banker’s oath nor the ethical reminder is mentioned before asking for financial advice. Depending on budget constraints, it is possible that we repeat the experiment in a different country to test for country specific effects.

To compare the intervention results with expectations from concerned parties, we separately administer a survey to financial professionals, regulators, and to the general population (representing potential customers). In this survey, we describe the interventions applied in the field and then ask the survey respondents (who are not involved in the experiment and also don't know the results) what response they expect from the bank employees in each treatment.

Experimental design

Between subjects design. Field experiment. Survey.

Design details

Randomization method
software
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
at least 150 observations; higher N depends on budget constraints
Observations
at least 150 observations; higher N depends on budget constraints
Arms
at least 50 observations; higher N depends on budget constraints
Primary outcomes
The financial advice that the bank employee gives in response to the ethical financial dilemma presented by the client.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords