Land Rental Markets: Experimental Evidence from Kenya

How to cite

Casaburi, Lorenzo; Willis, Jack. 2019. "Land Rental Markets: Experimental Evidence from Kenya." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004530. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4530-1.0

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Lorenzo Casaburi* , Jack Willis

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004530
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4530-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2019-07-15 – 2021-04-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4530

Abstract

In the experiment, we study the impact of renting out a plot on the plot and on the plot owner. A random sample of interested farmers receives a subsidy conditional on renting out a "target plot" (which is identified at baseline for all groups). Another group receives an unconditional subsidy. A final group is allocated to control. In a "first stage," we examine the impact of the rental subsidy on the likelihood that the target plot is rented out. In the main analysis, we plan to study the impact of renting out (instrumented with the subsidy) on plot-level and owner-level outcomes. The unconditional cash transfers will help shed light on the mechanisms behind this impact.

Intervention

We first collect names of farmers who own plots which: (i) they are not planning to rent out, and (ii) they would potentially be interested in renting out if they receive a subsidy to do so. Then we randomize these farmers into 3 groups:
1. Rental subsidy (payment conditional on renting the target plot)
2. Unconditional cash transfer
3. Control

Experimental design

We first collect names of farmers potentially interested in renting out an additional plot if they receive a subsidy to do so. Then we randomize these farmers into 3 groups:
1. Rental subsidy (conditional on renting the target plot)
2. Unconditional cash transfer
3. Control
For the analysis, we plan to instrument renting out with the rental subsidy (if the first stage is strong enough). If the unconditional cash transfer has little effect, we will report a specification with groups 2 and 3 pooled, so as to maximize power for the estimating the effect of renting out.
We will do multiple rounds of follow-up surveys: at least two, possibly more if funding allows.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization on a computer
Randomization unit
Farmer, with multiple levels of stratification
Clusters
N/A
Observations
Approximately 500 farmers in season 1. We may expand the sample in future seasons, depending on take-up
Arms
Approximately 170x3 treatment arms
Primary outcomes
1. "First-stage" outcomes and duration 2. Plot-level outcomes i. Characteristics of the plot manager (owner if not rented out, renter if rented out) a. Gender, age, education b. Household land endowment / use c. Household labor endowment / use d. Household wealth index e. Liquidity constraints f. Input use ii. Land use: cultivation vs. fallow, crops grown iii. Input use: labor, fertilizer, seeds, etc. iv. Output and productivity
Secondary outcomes
1. Plot-level outcomes i. Characteristics of the plot manager (owner if not rented out, renter if rented out) a. Agricultural knowledge and productivity b. Distance from plot c. Food security d. Savings and loans ii. Soil quality 2. Owner-level outcomes i. Outcomes for other (non-target) plots. Including productivity, input use, and rental decisions. ii. Non-agricultural activities iii. Household asset index iv. Food security v. Finance (savings, loans, liquidity, etc.)

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Keywords