Body Mass and Creditworthiness: Evidence from Loan Officers in Uganda
How to cite
Macchi, Elisa. 2019. "Body Mass and Creditworthiness: Evidence from Loan Officers in Uganda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004528. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4528-2.4
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In low income countries, overweight and obesity are more widespread among rich individuals. In contexts where income information is limited, high body mass might be exploited as signal of wealth. In this project I study how individuals' body mass affects their chance of accessing credit via a survey experiment in Uganda. Respondents are loan officers from a random subsample of licensed money lending institutions from the metropolitan area of Kampala, the capital. Loan officers are a key step in the process of accessing credit: They screen prospective clients, verify their information and upon verification, determine whether applicants qualify for the selected loan.
In the survey experiment, loan officers evaluate multiple hypothetical loan applications. As in the IRR paradigm by Kessler et al. (WP 2019), truthful answers are incentivised by providing real referrals. In the applications, I randomise body mass of hypothetical applicants, and evaluate how this affects loan officers' evaluations. My measure of access to credit are the loan officer’s 1) choice of meeting the hypothetical applicant; 2) likelihood of qualifying the loan application; 3) charged interest rate. Furthermore, to investigate the mechanism at play, I elicit 4) assessment of the applicant’s creditworthiness and 5) assessment of the applicants' ability to put the loan to productive use.
Loan officers evaluate in total 30 hypothetical applications, which are split into three treatment arms, which vary how much and in which way information on the applicant is presented (within-subject design). The three arms allow to pin down the mechanism at play, by allowing to understand at which point of the decision making process does the discrimination bites.
This set up allows to (1) test whether body mass affects perceived creditworthiness and access to credit, (2) test whether reducing asymmetric information on income changes the relevance of body mass in determining the decision, and (3) understand at which, if any, step of the decision making process does the discrimination bites.
Experimental design
Loan officers are asked to evaluate 30 hypothetical loan applications, in three sets. Each set is a treatment arm, the design exploits within subject variation and the order of the treatment arms is fixed. Each treatment arm varies according to how much and which information is presented. In the first treatment arm, respondents only see the picture, age and loan profile requested. In the second treatment arm, respondents only see the picture, age and loan profile requested but can choose to learn occupation and income of the applicant. In the third treatment arm, participants see all the information (including the picture) at once.
Within each treatment arm, the applications vary by characteristics; in each application, the applicants' age, nationality and place of residence are defined statically, while the applicants' loan profile, collateral, reason for loan, occupation, income (profits and revenues), gender, portrait, body mass are cross-randomised. Body mass is randomized by assigning the high body mass or low body mass photomorphed version of the randomly selected portrait. To avoid suspicions, portraits are randomized without replacement across the full set of applications each respondents receives so that no picture is seen twice by the same respondent.
Using the procedure detailed in the appendix, I first build 30 loan applications with all the cross randomized information, except body mass. Then I create the final set of 60 applications by creating two versions (a high body mass or low body mass) of each application. The 10 applications are randomly assigned to each arm stratified by characteristics. The order of the applications within each arm is random.
For each application, the loan officer answers the following questions:
1) Would you like us to refer to you this applicant to meet and discuss this loan application? Yes No
2) Based on your first impression, how likely would you be to approve this loan application? Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 Very likely
3) “Creditworthiness describes how likely a person is to repay a financial obligation according to the terms of the agreement.” Based on your first impression, how would you rate the person’s creditworthiness? Not at all creditworthy 1 2 3 4 5 Very creditworthy
4) Based on your first impression, how likely do you think this person would be to put the loan money to productive use? Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 Very likely
5) If you had to grant this loan to this person, what is the interest rate would you charge to this applicant?
Lower than standard - Standard - Higher than Standard
Interest rate question is only displayed to loan officers which have discretionality to change interest rates.
When answering the questions, the loan officers are informed that the applicants are hypothetical. Honest answers are incentivised by informing the loan officers that their answers will be used to provide referrals to prospective clients whose characteristics match with their preferences. The matching is performed using a machine learning algorithm, following Kessler et al. (2019).
The design allows to investigate whether
(1) body mass affects access to credit and creditworthiness,
(2) whether reducing asymmetric information on income changes the relevance of body mass in determining the decision,
(3) at which point of the decision making process does discrimination bites.
Relevant heterogeneity analysis include: 1) gender of applicant and loan officer; 2) body mass of the loan officer; 3) age of the loan officer; 4) perception of high body mass. If heterogeneity in the share of applicant invited is detected (either at the loan officers' level or at the institution level), I will compare "lemon dropping" types to "cherry picking" ones.
The incentives structure of the experiment is based on the idea that it is worthwhile for loan officers to receive good applicants. This incentives are the strongest when the loan officers' pay is tied to performance. While incentives might still be aligned also in the absence of performance pay (good applicants' referrals reduce screening and verification costs), nonetheless they are likely to be less relevant. Hence, if heterogeneity by performance pay will emerge, I will compare answers of high incentives vs low incentives loan officers.
Design details
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