Positive vs. Negative Incentives for Compliance: Evaluating a Randomized Tax Holiday
How to cite
Dunning, Thad; Tuñón, Guadalupe; Rosenblatt, Fernando; Piñeiro, Rafael; Monestier, Felipe. 2014. "Positive vs. Negative Incentives for Compliance: Evaluating a Randomized Tax Holiday." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000452. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.452-4.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Can positive rather than negative incentives boost tax compliance in developing countries? We study a unique randomized policy innovation in Montevideo, Uruguay, in which the municipal government raffles tax holidays to good taxpayers who are current on past payments. Using unusual access to over-time tax payment records as well as survey data, we assess the impact of holidays on subsequent tax compliance, as well as citizens' attitudes towards taxation and governance. We also use field and survey experiments to study the effects of informing eligible and ineligible taxpayers about the rebate lottery---which has not been effectively advertised by the government. Our informational treatments allow us to compare the influence of priming negative incentives for tax compliance, such as fines and punishment for non-payment, with the positive inducement provided by the lottery.
Intervention
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Experimental design
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Design details
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