The cost of intrinsic motivation - Policy interventions and their effects on behavioral spillovers

How to cite

Alt, Marius. 2019. "The cost of intrinsic motivation - Policy interventions and their effects on behavioral spillovers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004512. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4512-1.0

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Marius Alt*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004512
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4512-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-08-06 – 2019-11-01
Countries
Private
Secondary IDs
C91, D91, Q50
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4512

Abstract

The experimental design is conceived, in order to investigate how the influence of policy interventions, which target pro-environmental behavior, can lead to different degrees of behavioral spillover effects. We center the analysis on policy measures ranging from liberal paternalism to enforced regulation. Thereby, we exploit a characteristic of these measures; namely, the variations in subjects’ perceived voluntariness to conduct the targeted behavior. The perception of choosing a moral behavior voluntarily leaves room for warm glow and intrinsic motivation, which are assumed to mediate behavioral spillover effects. The experimental analysis will be conducted in a between-subject design with a non-student sample. The experiment consists of two subsequent pro-environmental tasks, for which extrinsic motivation is induced using three different policy interventions, comprising of either nudge, a monetary incentive or enforced compliance. Based on insights from the literature suggesting that the degree of voluntariness is pivotal for the size of behavioral spillover effects, we hypothesize that a larger the degree of perceived voluntariness in the first task, leads to lower effort in the second pro-environmental task.

Experimental design

The design aims at isolating the effect of policy interventions to incentivize pro-environmental behavior on subsequent pro-environmental behavior. The experiment is embedded in a discrete choice experiment, in which subjects must answer comprehension quesions in order to proceed to the decision stage. We turn this task in a pro-environmental real effort task, by tellinjg participants that each correctly answered question will lead to the plantation of a tree in an afforestation project. In additional treatments, effort is further incentivized by social comparison, monetary incentives and a punishment scheme. Also, a baseline is added as a control, in which answering the comprehensions questions has no material consequences. After the experiment, subjects have the opportunity to donate the participation fee to an environmental NGO, not being related to climate or afforestation. This represents the second behvavioral spillover task. The difference in donations between the baseline treatment and the respective other treatments will determine the behavioral spillover effect. As we keep the environmental outcome constant in the first task, we are able to isolate the effect of external pressure through policy interventions on behavioral spillover effects in form of subsequent donation levels.

Design details

Randomization method
By a computer.
Randomization unit
Assignment to treatments is determined randomly for each subject on an individual level with within-session variation.
Clusters
500 individual observations distributed over five treatments
Observations
500 Individuals
Arms
100 observations in "baseline. 100 observations in "NoIncentive". 100 observations in "Nudge". 100 observations in "Money". 100 observations in "Punishment".
Primary outcomes
Subjects donations in the second task at the intensive and extensive margin.
Secondary outcomes
Time needed to answer comprehension quesitons in the first part. Mistakes made, when answering comprehension questions.

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Keywords