Paying Farmers Not to Burn: A Randomized Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services in India

How to cite

Jayachandran, Seema; Jack, Kelsey; Kala, Namrata; Pande, Rohini. 2019. "Paying Farmers Not to Burn: A Randomized Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004508. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4508-2.2

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Seema Jayachandran* , Kelsey Jack , Namrata Kala , Rohini Pande

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004508
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4508-2.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-10-01 – 2020-03-31
Countries
India (Punjab)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4508

Abstract

This study evaluates a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) intervention that offers financial rewards for reducing burning of crop residue or 'stubble' among paddy farmers in Punjab, India. In addition to evaluating a standard PES contract, we will compare it to a contract that offers some of the payment upfront (without attempts to recoup it if the farmer does not meet the conditions). Adding this (de facto) unconditional component could increase overall cost-effectiveness if it increases compliance with the conditions, for example by easing liquidity constraints or by increasing participants' trust that the conditional payment will indeed be paid. PES with an upfront component might instead decrease cost-effectiveness because people who do not meet the conditions will receive some payment. The main outcome is whether the farmer burned his or her fields. Other outcomes are enrollment in the program, child respiratory health, and use of agricultural equipment and other inputs.

Intervention

There are 2 main treatments and one control group:

T1: Control group: No interventions

T2: Standard PES: Farmers will be offered a PES contract that pays them a cash transfer conditional on not burning their fields. This treatment is further divided into two sub-treatments: T2a pays 800 Rs/acre; T2b pays 1600 Rs/acre.

T3: PES with part of payment upfront: Farmers will be offered a PES contract, and if they accept the contract, they will receive either 25% (T3a) or 50% (T3b) of the PES payment from T2a (800 Rs/acre) as an unconditional cash transfer, and the remainder as a conditional payment, i.e. the conditional PES payment once it has been confirmed that their fields have not been burned.

Experimental design

A baseline survey and GIS measurement of paddy fields will take place prior to the paddy harvest season. Then the interventions (described in Interventions section) will be rolled out. For farmers offered the PES program who enroll, in-person monitoring will be used to verify they did not burn their fields. If the field monitor sees no evidence of burning, participants will receive their conditional payments, if applicable. Then an endline survey will be conducted.

Design details

Randomization method
By computer in office
Randomization unit
Village
Clusters
171 villages
Observations
~1700 farmers
Arms
T1: 51 villages T2: 58 villages T3: 62 villages
Primary outcomes
crop burning
Secondary outcomes
enrollment in the PES program, child respiratory health, use of "crop residue management" equipment and other inputs, agricultural outcomes

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords