Paying Farmers Not to Burn: A Randomized Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services in India
How to cite
Jayachandran, Seema; Jack, Kelsey; Kala, Namrata; Pande, Rohini. 2019. "Paying Farmers Not to Burn: A Randomized Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004508. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4508-2.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study evaluates a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) intervention that offers financial rewards for reducing burning of crop residue or 'stubble' among paddy farmers in Punjab, India. In addition to evaluating a standard PES contract, we will compare it to a contract that offers some of the payment upfront (without attempts to recoup it if the farmer does not meet the conditions). Adding this (de facto) unconditional component could increase overall cost-effectiveness if it increases compliance with the conditions, for example by easing liquidity constraints or by increasing participants' trust that the conditional payment will indeed be paid. PES with an upfront component might instead decrease cost-effectiveness because people who do not meet the conditions will receive some payment. The main outcome is whether the farmer burned his or her fields. Other outcomes are enrollment in the program, child respiratory health, and use of agricultural equipment and other inputs.
Intervention
There are 2 main treatments and one control group:
T1: Control group: No interventions
T2: Standard PES: Farmers will be offered a PES contract that pays them a cash transfer conditional on not burning their fields. This treatment is further divided into two sub-treatments: T2a pays 800 Rs/acre; T2b pays 1600 Rs/acre.
T3: PES with part of payment upfront: Farmers will be offered a PES contract, and if they accept the contract, they will receive either 25% (T3a) or 50% (T3b) of the PES payment from T2a (800 Rs/acre) as an unconditional cash transfer, and the remainder as a conditional payment, i.e. the conditional PES payment once it has been confirmed that their fields have not been burned.
Experimental design
A baseline survey and GIS measurement of paddy fields will take place prior to the paddy harvest season. Then the interventions (described in Interventions section) will be rolled out. For farmers offered the PES program who enroll, in-person monitoring will be used to verify they did not burn their fields. If the field monitor sees no evidence of burning, participants will receive their conditional payments, if applicable. Then an endline survey will be conducted.
Design details
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