Risk aversion, earning uncertainty and labour supply

How to cite

Avram, Silvia. 2019. "Risk aversion, earning uncertainty and labour supply." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004499. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4499-1.2

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Silvia Avram*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004499
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4499-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-07-22 – 2020-06-01
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Essex)
JEL codes
D91, D84, H31, I38, J20
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4499

Abstract

The goal of the experiment is to test the existence of a causal effect of earnings uncertainty on labour supply at the extensive margin in the presence of out-of-work benefits. The design of the experiment is strongly inspired by how zero hours contracts work, i.e. what is uncertain is not the pay rate itself but the availability of work. At the same time, if work is not available, participants do not have an alternative possibility of gaining income but they do gain ‘leisure’. The experiment aims to study the decision to take up a job with insecure pay when there is an alternative out of work benefit that is lost.

Intervention

The intervention primarily consists in introducing uncertainty about the availability of work. Other dimensions that are varied are the pay rate and the availability of an outside option.

Experimental design

Participants choose between a real-effort task and a fixed payment. The decision is repeated in 24 rounds. There are three arms. In the control group, work is always available. In the two treatment groups, work is only availabile with a 50% probability. The two treatment groups differ in the pay rate for the real-effort task. In the second phase, the availability of the fixed payment is varied.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is done by the computer (treatment assignment) in conjunction with drawing a ball from a non-transparent urn (participant number).
Randomization unit
The randomization is done at the individual level.
Clusters
400 individuals.
Observations
400 individuals.
Arms
66 individuals phase 1 control, phase 2 control, 66 individuals phase 1 control, phase 2 benefit sanction, 66 individuals, phase 1 treatment 1, phase 2 benefit sanction, 66 individuals phase 1 treatment 2, phase 2 benefit present, 66 individuals phase 1 treatment 2, phase 2 benefit sanctions, 66 individuals phase 1 treatment 2, phase 2 benefit present.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is the decision to work or not to work under the different treatments. The treatments vary along 3 dimensions: 1) uncertainty in the availability of work 2) the pay rate 3) The outside option: how much is leaisure paid for and is the payment certain or not.
Secondary outcomes
Risk aversion measurement.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Avram, S. (2022). Do workers like employer driven flexibility? Experimental evidence on work and pay uncertainty and willingness to work. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 31(5), 685-697. doi:10.1080/1359432X.2021.2021885 https://doi.org/10.1080/1359432X.2021.2021885

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords