The effect of jump bids on final prices in auctions

How to cite

Rezaei, Sarah; Delnoij, Joyce; Rijt, Arnout van de. 2019. "The effect of jump bids on final prices in auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004481. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4481-1.0

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Sarah Rezaei* , Joyce Delnoij , Arnout van de Rijt

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004481
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4481-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2019-04-05 – 2019-09-06
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C9, D9
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4481

Abstract

A frequently observed behavior in online auctions is jump bidding: a strategy in which bidders place higher bids than what is necessary to become the current highest bidder. While multiple theories explaining jump bidding in ascending auctions exist (e.g. Avery, 1998; Isaac, Salmon & Zillante, 2007), there is hardly any consensus on the direction and size of the effect of jump bidding on the seller’s revenue. We therefore design an experiment to evaluate the effect of jump bidding behavior on the final price of an auctioned item, under controlled conditions. In randomized controlled trials, we either (i) do not bid (control), (ii) make an early jump bid far below the estimated value of the item, or (iii) make incremental bids up to the value of the jump bid made in condition (ii). We test whether the bidding behavior by others and the final price differ between experimental conditions. Understanding the effects of jump bidding behavior may help design more efficient online auctions and prevent market failure.

Intervention

We are going to collect data from an online auction website. We then randomly assign each auction to one of our three experimental treatments. As soon as the auctions begin, we place the first bid on the items based on the rules of the treatments they have been randomly assigned to. In treatment 1, our control condition, we do not intervene in the bidding. In treatment 2, we place a jump bid. In treatment 3, we place an automatic bid. After all auctions have ended, we request the platform for the bidding data.

Experimental design

We are going to collect data from an online auction website. We then randomly assign each auction to one of our three experimental treatments. As soon as the auctions begin, we place the first bid on the items based on the rules of the treatments they have been randomly assigned to. In treatment 1, our control condition, we do not intervene in the bidding. In treatment 2, we place a jump bid. In treatment 3, we place an automatic bid. After all auctions have ended, we request the platform for the bidding data.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
treatments assigned to the items offered in the online auction. the size of bid assigned to each item.
Clusters
1
Observations
1200
Arms
400 treatment 1 400 treatment 2 400 treatment 3
Primary outcomes
Final price of an item, Seller revenue.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords