Overcoming Adverse Selection: Understanding Sorting in Response to Performance Incentives
How to cite
Brown, Christina; Andrabi, Tahir. 2019. "Overcoming Adverse Selection: Understanding Sorting in Response to Performance Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004471. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4471-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines whether higher quality teachers prefer and select into schools which offer performance incentives. Using a randomized control trial, which varied whether teacher raises were based on i). objective performance (their students' percentile value-added), ii). subjective performance (as rated by their principal) or iii). a flat raise, unrelated to performance, we investigate the composition of teachers which end up teaching at each type of school a year after the introduction of the contracts. Additional variation in the type of contract offered, principal information and teachers' information about their midterm performance allows us to disentangle the role of risk-preferences versus private information in their sorting decision. Using this data, we then model a two-sided choice problem of teacher employment to predict what would happen if all schools moved to performance contracts and the extent of adverse selection that is corrected through these contracts.
Intervention
A. Incentive Treatments
Control: Flat raise - All teachers will receive the same raise (about 7%) at the end of the calendar year. This is equal to about twice the cost of living inflation.
Treatment 1a: Subjective Performance Raise - All teachers will be rated by their direct supervisor (usually a principal or vice principal) on the teacher's "effort in improving students' academic performance'' on a scale from 0-100. Supervisors will give a short justification for their rating. Within the school, teachers will then be ranked according to this subjective score, placed into 5 bins and given a raise from 0-15% based on their ranking.
Treatment 1b: Subject Performance Raise - All teachers will be rated by their direct supervisor (usually a principal or vice principal) on a number of criteria determined by HR, such as timeliness, communication and professional integrity on a scale from 0-100. Supervisors will give a short justification for their rating. Within the school, teachers will then be ranked according to this subjective score, placed into 5 bins and given a raise from 0-15% based on their ranking.
Treatment 2: Objective Performance Raise - All teachers receive a raise based on percentile value-added (Barlevy and Neal, 2016) -- their students' average percentile within their lagged percentile comparison group on the standardized exam at the end of each semester. Teachers will then be ranked within the school based on this measure of value added, placed into 5 bins and receive a raise varying from 0-15%.
On average the raise percentage is the same across all treatments.
B. Observation Treatment
Control: Status quo – Teachers observed at the normal frequency by their supervisor, typically once a semester
Treatment: Frequent observation – Principals are requested to observe teachers for at least 10 minutes once every three weeks
C. Information Treatment
Mid-way into the intervention, a fraction of teachers were told their mid-term performance under different incentive schemes. This was randomized at the teacher level.
All teachers were provided information about the treatment assignment of all other schools in the system in the event they wanted to change schools.
Experimental design
We randomly assign teachers to receive a variety of incentive contracts and cross randomize with how often their manager observes them and whether they learn about their performance half way through the intervention. The key specification will look at whether higher quality teachers (as measured by baseline value-added and teacher effort) i). choose performance pay in incentivized choice experiments and/or ii). sort into performance pay schools. We will see if this varies by the riskiness associated with each contract and the information teachers have about their own performance. We will also disentangle the extent of sorting that takes place based on the teachers' unincentivized quality "type" versus sorting on their treatment effect "type"(ie. how much they respond to incentives).
We will then take these results to a two-sided choice model to understand the extent of adverse selection that can be corrected by introducing these contracts given the information principals already have about their own teachers.
Note: The design details presented here were outlined in Ms. Brown's orals' prospectus in March 2018 prior to any midline or endline data being collected but after the beginning of the treatment intervention. Prospectus available upon request. Further details about a companion study were previously registered here: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3835
Design details
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