Strategic Curiosity
How to cite
Ay, Fehime Ceren; Berge, Joel; Nødvedt, Katrine Berg. 2019. "Strategic Curiosity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004402. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4402-2.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this study, we investigate whether people use curiosity in a strategic manner to justify dishonest behavior. Specifically, we propose that individuals experiencing a want-should conflict will be motivated to acquire information that can serve as a potential justification to act in line with their temptations. Just as people might be strategically ignorant, we propose that people also have a tendency to acquire non-instrumental information for the sake of justifying their own selfishness - we call this "strategic curiosity". As such, we conjecture that people are not merely passive receivers of information but that they shape their information environment to serve their self-interest. To test our predictions, we conduct a digital version of the die-under-the-cup task, where subjects roll a virtual die and report the outcome for monetary rewards. In this controlled setting, we experimentally manipulate the availability of superfluous information and whether this information has the potential to justify dishonesty. Our manipulations focus on mainly two directions: how many times the die can be rolled and the outcome of the die. This study can have a wide range of practical implications and can open up a strand of research that focuses on understanding how people actively shape their information environment to serve their own self-interest.
Intervention
It is an online experiment which is conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The complete task takes about 7 minutes, treatments are built on the outcome of a die-rolling task and how many times it can be rolled.
Experimental design
We employ a digital version of the die-under-the-cup task (Shalvi et al. ,2011) where subjects roll a virtual die and report the outcome for monetary rewards. We choose the die-rolling setting as it allows us to experimentally vary the demand for justifications. Before rolling, all participants will be shown the payoff structure for their report, i.e. higher reported numbers will result in higher payoffs. The digital die will be programmed to be fair: it will randomly display the numbers of 1 through 6. The outcomes of the die is recorded, which means that this is an observed game similar to games used in recent studies on dishonesty (Gneezy et al. 2018; Pittarello et al., 2015). This design enables us to investigate whether the outcome of the first roll affects the probability that participants would want to roll more than once. Thus, we can test directly whether the distance between the observed outcome and the wealth-maximizing outcome predicts information acquisition.
Design details
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