Something to Complain About: Political Conflict, Voice and Grievance Redress Mechanisms

How to cite

Mamidipudi, Ramakrishna Sharan; Kumar, Chinmaya. 2019. "Something to Complain About: Political Conflict, Voice and Grievance Redress Mechanisms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004308. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4308-1.1

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Ramakrishna Sharan Mamidipudi* , Chinmaya Kumar

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004308
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4308-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-05-17 – 2020-06-01
Countries
India (Bihar)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4308

Abstract

The process of development is uneven, often leaving behind political minorities and marginalized groups. In this paper, we present new evidence of historically marginalized groups using the relatively nascent technology of grievance redressal mechanisms to exercise voice, negotiate conflict and, crucially, attempt to make development more equitable. Our reduced form causal results establish the following: lower-tiered marginalized representatives - who are also members of the state - use grievance redressal mechanisms to lobby upper tiers of the state for improved public good provision. We then show that marginalized representatives are particularly likely to file grievances when there is some pre-existing conflict between them and their upper-tier counterparts. Potential for conflict also worsens public good provision. The objective of this experiment is to understand how, if at all, grievance filing by incumbent lower-tiered representatives from marginalized groups affects provision of water-and-sanitation (WAS) public goods in their jurisdictions. We also intend to measure spillover effects of grievance filing by representatives.

Intervention

Our objective is to understand how, if at all, grievance filing by incumbent lower-tiered representatives from marginalized groups (specifically Scheduled Castes - SCs) affects provision of water-and-sanitation (WAS) public goods in their jurisdictions. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:

(i) Does grievance filing by SC lower-tiered representatives initiate construction of WAS public goods in these jurisdictions?
(ii) Are there spillover effects of grievance filing - i.e does grievance filing by a lower-tiered representative in one jurisdiction result in more (a) grievance filing and (b) WAS public good construction in jurisdictions of other lower-tiered representative close to treated jurisdiction?
(iii) How does grievance filing change the nature of interaction between lower-tiered representatives and upper-tiered representatives/bureaucrats? How does it affect how the lower-tiered representative is perceived by their constituents?
(iv) If grievance redressal mechanisms are powerful tools, why, then, is grievance filing so low? Specifically, can information alone suffice to initiate grievance filing?

Experimental design

All treatments are administered over the phone in our setting. The experiment comprises two treatments arms: a grievance-filing (G) treatment and an information-only (I) treatment.

In Treatment G, we call randomly sampled SC lower-tiered representatives where, as per official records, no WAS work has been undertaken and provided them information about the grievance redressal scheme and offer to file grievances on the representatives' behalf. Our main objective here is to measure the impact of grievance filing on WAS public good provision.

In Treatment I, we call randomly sampled SC lower-tiered politicians and only provide information. The key difference between Treatment G and Treatment I is that in the latter, we do not offer to file grievances. Our main objective here is to see if information alone suffices to increase the number of grievances filed.

We intend to treat about 800 representatives with Treatment G, 150 representatives with treatment I and 800 control representatives.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by the ODK software that is used by enumerators on their phones in two ways: (a) Treatment G vs Control: randomized with equal probability (50 % each). (b) Treatment G and Treatment I vs Control: Randomized with equal probability (33.33 % each).
Randomization unit
Ward.
Clusters
1750
Observations
1750
Arms
800 Treatment G wards, 150 Treatment I wards, 800 Control wards.
Primary outcomes
(i) WAS Asset Construction (from WAS MIS Data/Endline Survey) (ii) Grievance Filing (from Grievance Redressal MIS data/Endline Data) (iii) Political and Bureaucratic Effects (Endline Survey of lower- and upper-tiered representatives and citizens) (iv) Perceived state capacity (v) Process outcomes related to grievance hearings

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords