Revealed-Incentives in Team Performance
How to cite
Phung, Phuc; Suetens, Sigrid. 2019. "Revealed-Incentives in Team Performance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004307. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4307-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Using Public Good Game to examine contribution levels in teamwork, I assess whether in a context of no-anonymity, having heterogeneity in marginal per-capita return (MPCR) and/or knowing the MPCR of other team members can affect the average contribution level. I hypothesize that when participants in a team have different MPCR and can observe the MPCR of the other team members, contributions will increase. The “revealed incentives” in teamwork, represented by the MPCR, act as a noisy predictor of the private contributions and drive up the contributions as participants have “image motivation”.
Experimental design
Using z-tree, we plan to conduct the computerized experiment at CentER lab in Tilburg University and recruit participants from our subject pool. In each session, subjects are randomly allocated to teams of three members and play the standard Public Good Game for 10 rounds. In each round, each member needs to allocate 20 tokens to their Private Account and the Team Account. The gain in each round is the sum of the private allocation and the total team contribution – scaled by the marginal per-capita return (MPCR). We implement a 2-by-2 factorial design with two treatment variables: Reveal-Hidden and Symmetric-Asymmetric. In Reveal-Hidden treatment, we either let subjects in a team see the MPCR of every team members or keep this information hidden. In Symmetric-Asymmetric treatment, we either set the MPCR the same for all team members (0.5) or different across team members (0.25, 0.5, 0.75). Moreover, subjects in a team are not anonymous to each other: the photos of the team members are displayed on the screen during the phase in which subjects need to make the allocation decision.
Design details
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