Strategic Disclosure and Startup Funding
How to cite
Guzman, Jorge; Yu, Sandy; Chiles, Bennett. 2019. "Strategic Disclosure and Startup Funding." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004291. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4291-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project studies the extent to which withholding information about a startup can influence the evaluation of and financing of startups. To do so, we perform two randomized control trials asking two distinct populations of investment related individuals to assess the value of a startup by looking at two investment decks. We include four treatment arms, where we (a) withhold information about the team background, (b) withhold information about team financing, (c) include both pieces of information, or (d) omit both pieces of information. We then assess, as our primary outcome, the extent to which subjects differentially evaluate a startup based on this absence of information. As a secondary outcome, we consider the total time spent on the remaining slides and the ways in which subjects use other information to assess startup quality, using a slide-tracking software (DocSend) that allows us to see how many seconds each individual spends in each slide.
Intervention
This project studies the extent to which withholding information about a startup can influence the evaluation of and financing of startups. To do so, we perform two randomized control trials asking two distinct populations of investment related individuals to assess the value of a startup by looking at two investment decks. We include four treatment arms, where we (a) withhold information about the team background, (b) withhold information about team financing, (c) include both pieces of information, or (d) omit both pieces of information. We then assess, as our primary outcome, the extent to which subjects differentially evaluate a startup based on this absence of information. As a secondary outcome, we consider the total time spent on the remaining slides and the ways in which subjects use other information to assess startup quality, using a slide-tracking software (DocSend) that allows us to see how many seconds each individual spends in each slide.
Experimental design
This project studies the extent to which withholding information about a startup can influence the evaluation of and financing of startups. To do so, we perform two randomized control trials asking two distinct populations of investment related individuals to assess the value of a startup by looking at two investment decks. We include four treatment arms, where we (a) withhold information about the team background, (b) withhold information about team financing, (c) include both pieces of information, or (d) omit both pieces of information. We then assess, as our primary outcome, the extent to which subjects differentially evaluate a startup based on this absence of information. As a secondary outcome, we consider the total time spent on the slides and the ways in which subjects use other information to assess startup quality, using a slide-tracking software (DocSend) that allows us to see how many seconds each individual spends in each slide.
Design details
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