The effect of anger in the beauty contest: A laboratory experiment
How to cite
Castagnetti, Sergio Alessandro; Proto, Eugenio. 2019. "The effect of anger in the beauty contest: A laboratory experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004267. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4267-1.3
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This laboratory experiment aims to understand the impact of incidental anger on strategic interactions between individuals. It follows a recent view in the literature suggesting that anger is a commitment device that leads individuals to ignore or switch-off the capacity of forming higher order beliefs (e.g. Frank [1987], Meshulam et al. [2012], Van Leeuwen et al. [2017]). In particular, our experimental design will allow us to understand whether being angry affects strategic play and performance in a repeated beauty contest game.
Intervention
Description of the Experiment
We now provide a summary description of our experimental design. First, at the outset of the experiment, participants in the same session will be randomly allocated to one of two conditions: the treatment and the control conditions. In the treatment condition, participants will be induced (incidental) anger through procedures that are commonly used in social psychology; whereas participants in the control condition will not be induced any specific emotion. Following this stage, participants will then be matched in groups of three. The group’s composition will consist of two participants who are in the same condition and one that is in the opposite condition. Thus, they will play the beauty contest game repeatedly and for 10 rounds with fixed group matching. Participants will be told that one randomly drawn round will count for payments.
In this paper we thus exogenously induce anger to causally study the impact of this emotion on depth of reasoning and higher order beliefs. Our induction procedure relies on methods and techniques commonly used in social psychology and which validity has been extensively shown. In this way, we can cleanly understand the impact of anger on cognition and its implications in a specific setting. In particular, we look at how this emotion affects depth of reasoning in a repeatedly beauty contest game.
This design will allow us to cleanly analyse the causal effect of anger on a strategic game (i.e., the beauty contest) and to understand how anger affects higher order beliefs in this game. In particular, we will address the following two questions: 1) Does anger detrimentally affect the way individuals reason about others’ behavior? And, 2) Does anger affect the way individuals learn over time to best respond to others’ choices?
Experimental design
In the first part of the experiment, participants will first be asked to fill a demographic questionnaire and then will be asked to complete the PANAS survey to assess participants baseline affect. Thus, participants will randomly be allocated to one of two conditions: (i) the anger condition; and, (ii) the neutral condition. In other words, we will randomize our treatment groups at the session level. More specifically, in the anger condition participants will be asked to recall past life events where they felt anger. While in the neutral condition participants will be asked to recall past everyday activities. This part will last 10 minutes and will complete part I.
The second part of the experiment consists of the beauty contest game following the design in Gill & Prowse (2016). That is, participants will be matched in groups of three and will play the game for 10 rounds. The matching protocol will be such that participants will be in mixed groups: 2 players from one condition with one player from the other condition. Thus, we will have two possible groups: 2 participants from the anger condition and 1 participant from the neutral condition, and vice versa. The beauty contest game will consist of ten rounds. In each round, participants will be asked to choose an integer (between 0 and 100). The number that is closest to the 70% of the average of all 3 chosen numbers will win that round. After every participant has made his/her choice, participants will then receive the following information: (i) the numbers chosen by each group member; (ii) the average of all 3 chosen numbers; (iii) what 70% of the average of all 3 chosen numbers was; (iv) whether they won the round or not. At the end of the ten rounds, the computer program (O-tree, Chen et al. 2016) will randomly select one round that will count for payments. Participants will be aware that only one round will count for payments.
After participants had completed part II (i.e., the beauty contest game), they will be asked to fill a set of questionnaires. First, they will be asked to fill again the PANAS questionnaire to assess the efficacy of the induction procedure. They will also be asked to complete a questionnaire that assess participants’ feelings while in task 1. Then, participants will be asked to complete a propensity to anger questionnaire (Staxi, Spielberger, 1999).
After these questionnaires, we will elicit risk preferences using the non-incentivised question by Dohmen et al. (2011). Finally, we will ask participants whether they had previously played the beauty contest game to control for experience.
References
Chen, D. L., Schonger, M., & Wickens, C. (2016). oTree – An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 9, 88-97.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., & Wagner, G. G. (2011). Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(3), 522-550.
Frank, R.H. (1987). If homo economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience? American Economic Review, 77, 593-604.
Gill, D., & Prowse, V. (2016). Cognitive ability, character skills, and learning to play equilibrium: A level-k analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 124(6), 1619-1676.
Meshulam, M., Winter, E., Ben-Shakhar, G., & Aharon, I. (2012). Rational emotions. Social Neuroscience, 7(1), 11-17
Spielberger, C.D., (1999). Staxi-2: state-trait anger expression inventory-2, professional manual. Psychological Assessment Resources
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of personality and social psychology, 54(6), 1063.
Van Leeuwen, B., Noussair, C. N., Offerman, T., Suetens, S., Van Veelen, M., & Van De Ven, J. (2017). Predictably angry—facial cues provide a credible signal of destructive behavior. Management Science, 64(7), 3352-3364.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Alessandro Castagnetti, Eugenio Proto, Andis Sofianos, Anger impairs strategic behavior: A Beauty-Contest based analysis, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 213, 2023, Pages 128-141, ISSN 0167-2681, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.06.027. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268123002330) Keywords: Anger; Induced emotions; Strategic interactions; Beauty-contest https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.06.027
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