Nudging organizations: evidence from three large-scale field experiments

How to cite

Ferraro, Paul; Fan, James; Weigel, Collin; Messer, Kent. 2019. "Nudging organizations: evidence from three large-scale field experiments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004238. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4238-2.0

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Paul Ferraro* , James Fan , Collin Weigel , Kent Messer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004238
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4238-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-03-31 – 2018-10-01
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4238

Abstract

Nudges and changes to choice architecture can affect individual behaviors, especially for infrequent, unfamiliar decisions. However, whether the same interventions are equally effective in changing the behaviors of experts leading an organization is an open question. We use three randomized field experiments to test the efficacy of five nudges and changes in choice architecture that have been shown to affect individual-level decisions in public good provision and charitable giving contexts. The nudges are 1) raising the salience of the ask, 2) emphasizing the public benefits from contributions, 3) providing social comparisons, 4) publicly recognizing contributors (creating observability), and 5) setting a collective goal. In the three field experiments, local organizations make decisions about whether to contribute financially to a national coordinating organization. The local organizations are conservation districts in the United States, which are independent, nonprofit organizations managed by elected local agricultural operators. In comparison to the estimated treatment effects of similar interventions among individuals, our estimated effects on organizations are dramatically smaller and of the opposite sign. Our results, in combination with prior laboratory studies on group-individual differences, suggest that nudges and changes in choice architecture may not affect the behaviors of experts leading organizations to the same degree as they affect the behaviors of individuals making infrequent and unfamiliar decisions.

Intervention

We use three randomized field experiments to test the efficacy of five nudges and changes in choice architecture that have been shown to affect individual-level decisions in public good provision and charitable giving contexts. The nudges are 1) raising the salience of the ask, 2) emphasizing the public benefits from contributions, 3) providing social comparisons, 4) publicly recognizing contributors (creating observability), and 5) setting a collective goal.

Experimental design

The first field experiment took place in fiscal year 2015-16 (FY16), the second in fiscal year 2016-17 (FY17), and the third in fiscal year 2017-2018 (FY18). In the three experiments, districts were randomly assigned, blocking on state and previous contributions, to one of two groups, a control (status quo) group or a treatment group. The control group received the standard mailing from NACD.

In FY16, districts who had not yet paid their dues by the end of the second quarter were treated in the third and fourth quarters. In FY17 and FY18, districts who had not yet paid by the end of the first quarter were treated in the second, third and fourth quarters. Treatment assignment was later in FY16 because we started collaborating with NACD in March 2016. The FY17 and FY18 experiments did not start in the first quarter because: (1) NACD and the authors agreed to analyze the previous year’s results before initiating another experiment (complete data were not available until after the first quarter began); and (2) the districts that contribute in the first quarter tend to contribute every year at or above the $775 level, and thus were not part of the population that NACD targeted for increased contributions.

In FY16, we made three changes to the mailing: 1) we made the “ask” clearer and more salient, 2) we highlighted the accomplishments of NACD, and 3) we provided social information via a social (peer) comparison. We tested the combined effect of these treatments, which are described in more detail below.

In FY17, we tested a new treatment: making contributors observable to other districts. Historically, only the national office knew which districts paid their dues and how much they paid. There was no public recognition of contributors or their contribution levels. The absence of public recognition was a deliberate decision. NACD believed that publicly recognizing contributors could stigmatize, or even indirectly ostracize, the non-contributors.

In FY18, we tested another modification in the treatment group: announcing a national goal for total contributions. Each quarter, progress towards the goal was displayed as a percentage, visualized as a thermometer.

Design details

Randomization method
In the three experiments, districts were randomly assigned using a computer, blocking on state and previous contributions, to one of two groups, a control (status quo) group or a treatment group. The control group received the standard mailing from NACD.
Randomization unit
Individual districts are the unit of randomization
Clusters
1,231 districts in FY16, 1,732 districts in FY17, and 1447 districts in FY18
Observations
1,231 districts in FY16, 1,732 districts in FY17, and 1447 districts in FY18
Arms
617 districts in treatment, 614 districts in control for FY16. 862 districts in treatment, 870 districts in control for FY17. 746 districts for treatment, 701 districts in control for FY18.
Primary outcomes
We seek to estimate the average treatment effect on the monetary value of a district’s annual contribution.

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Keywords