Asymmetric treatment in joint-liability loan contracts
How to cite
Suetens, Sigrid; Visser, Philine; Carli, Franscesco; Uras, Burak. 2019. "Asymmetric treatment in joint-liability loan contracts." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004217. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4217-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Group lending is a common practice that microfinance institutions (MFIs) utilize when lending to individuals without collateral. By making borrowers co-sign, MFIs can mitigate moral hazard problems without requiring collateral. The joint liability gives incentives to borrowers to monitor each other. However, if all borrowers have the same contract terms, it is not clear that the incentives to monitor are strong enough. They may end up in a joint non-monitoring outcome with bad investments and losses for the MFI as a result. Carli and Uras (2017) show in a theoretical model that coordination on non-monitoring can be avoided by designing contracts such that one of the borrowers (a leader) finds it optimal to monitor the peer borrowers in a group loan contract, thereby inducing the peers to invest in good projects and in turn to monitor the leader's own project choice. It is an open question, however, to which extent non-monitoring is empirically relevant in the case that contract terms are symmetric. Our study aims to answer this question.
Experimental design
between-subjects 2x2 design:
asymmetric contracts versus symmetric contracts
strangers matching versus partners matching
Design details
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