Asymmetric treatment in joint-liability loan contracts

How to cite

Suetens, Sigrid; Visser, Philine; Carli, Franscesco; Uras, Burak. 2019. "Asymmetric treatment in joint-liability loan contracts." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004217. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4217-1.0

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Sigrid Suetens* , Philine Visser , Franscesco Carli , Burak Uras

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004217
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4217-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-05-28 – 2019-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4217

Abstract

Group lending is a common practice that microfinance institutions (MFIs) utilize when lending to individuals without collateral. By making borrowers co-sign, MFIs can mitigate moral hazard problems without requiring collateral. The joint liability gives incentives to borrowers to monitor each other. However, if all borrowers have the same contract terms, it is not clear that the incentives to monitor are strong enough. They may end up in a joint non-monitoring outcome with bad investments and losses for the MFI as a result. Carli and Uras (2017) show in a theoretical model that coordination on non-monitoring can be avoided by designing contracts such that one of the borrowers (a leader) finds it optimal to monitor the peer borrowers in a group loan contract, thereby inducing the peers to invest in good projects and in turn to monitor the leader's own project choice. It is an open question, however, to which extent non-monitoring is empirically relevant in the case that contract terms are symmetric. Our study aims to answer this question.

Experimental design

between-subjects 2x2 design:
asymmetric contracts versus symmetric contracts
strangers matching versus partners matching

Design details

Randomization method
participants randomly draw a card with a number and are allocated to a computer with that number; random matching is done with the computer
Randomization unit
the randomization unit is the matching group in the strangers treatments and the pair in the partners treatments
Clusters
38 (20 in partners and 8 in strangers)
Observations
120 (40 in partners and 80 in strangers)
Arms
partners & symmetric: 20 (10 clusters) partners & asymmetric: 20 (10 clusters) strangers & symmetric: 40 (4 clusters) strangers & asymmetric: 40 (4 clusters)
Primary outcomes
the percentage of times borrowers choose to monitor; MFI profits; profits of borrowers

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords