Gift exchange in markets for credence goods
How to cite
Reins, Evert; Lanz, Bruno. 2019. "Gift exchange in markets for credence goods." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004213. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4213-4.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We experimentally investigate the effect of gift exchange in markets for credence goods. In such markets an expert-seller diagnoses the extent of a consumers’ problem, performs the treatment and finally charges a price for his services. The consumer is never informed about the extent of his problem and he cannot verify the treatment performed by the expert-seller. Consequently expert-sellers have incentives to exploit the informational asymmetries by performing inefficient treatments. Such market inefficiencies have been documented in both laboratory and field studies. In our laboratory study, we give the consumer the possibility to gift the expert-seller, either unconditionally or conditional on receiving efficient services. Theories on other regarding behavior predict that the expert-seller will reciprocate to gifts thereby performing more efficient services. We expect to confirm this hypothesis, which allows us to draw novel implications on how to prevent fraudulent services of experts.
Experimental design
We replicate the (B/N) condition in Dulleck et al. (2011) "The economics of credence goods: An experiment on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation, and competition." and use it as a BASELINE condition. In the second treatment (GIFT) condition, we extend the BASELINE by giving the consumer the possibility to gift the expert. Implementing the gift constitutes a minor change in the BASELINE stage game: having decided to interact with an expert, the costumer is asked whether he wants to gift the expert with a certain amount x in {0;1} which will be deducted from the consumers final payoff. The amount x is then transfered to the expert. This transfer will be displayed to the expert before he decides on the treatment and on pricing. Apart from this, the BASELINE will not be changed. The third treatment (GIFT CONDITIONAL) is identical from the GIFT condition, except that the transfer x will only realize if the expert-seller provides a sufficient treatment.
Design details
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