Unlocking Access to Credit through Technological Innovation

How to cite

Wolfram, Catherine; Green, Brett; Gertler, Paul. 2019. "Unlocking Access to Credit through Technological Innovation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004191. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4191-1.0

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Catherine Wolfram* , Brett Green , Paul Gertler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004191
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4191-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-05-13 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4191

Abstract

The proliferation of mobile technologies and digital payments systems have the potential to radically change the credit market landscape in developing economies. In this project we will explore how a combination of these recent advances have facilitated an innovative financial contract that utilizes a new form of collateral, which is designed to enhance technology adoption and access to collateralized borrowing in the developing world. We will then explore the extent to which this collateral can be "re-used" to provide poor households with affordable and recurrent access to credit markets.

Experimental design

A randomized control trial will be utilized to answer our research questions surrounding the use of technology. Both a baseline and endline survey will be conducted to understand the e ffect of credit on economic and educational outcomes. Figure 2 (in the Appendix) illustrates the experimental design. The sample consists of individuals who are eligible for school fee loans (based on their repayment history and credit score). We randomize the sample into 3 treatment groups and 1 control group. In the rst treatment (T1), the customer is o ered a loan that utilizes the lockout facility. Among customers who have fully repaid their ReadyPay loan (R) and accept the loan off er in T1, a randomly selected fraction will actually recieve a loan that does not utilize lockout. The element of "surprise" is meant to isolate the e ffect of selection from other considerations and has been used in prior work (Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Finan et al., 2018). The second treatment is a loan without a lockout facility and the third treatment is a menu which allows the customer to choose between a loan with or without a lockout system, which allows customers to self-select into the loan type that better fi ts their preferences.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
The population of individuals of interest live within 14000 villages, but treatment will be clustered at the individual level. 1400 villages likely reached.
Observations
With regards to number of surveys: 2633 in fully-repaid, and 3494 in in-repayment
Arms
With regards to number of surveys: 529 individuals in fully repaid control, 1270 individuals in fully repaid lockout (784 individuals in surprise, no lockout, and 486 individuals in lockout), 784 individuals fully repaid no lockout, and 50 individuals in the menu group. Of less priority, and not being surveyed but expecting to respond to initial message: 1808 customers individuals in in-repayment lockout, 1486 in in-repayment control, and 200 lock out without deposit
Primary outcomes
Take-up of loans, loan repayment, adverse selection, moral hazard, menu of contracts

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords