The Value of Delegation in Hiring

How to cite

Wu, Hugh Xiaolong; Liu, Shannon. 2019. "The Value of Delegation in Hiring." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004172. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4172-2.0

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Hugh Xiaolong Wu* , Shannon Liu

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004172
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4172-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2018-06-01 – 2019-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
L1, M0, M5
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4172

Abstract

For large chain businesses, local managers are granted various degrees of hiring autonomy from the headquarter. Delegation in hiring, when the managers of a local branch or store are empowered to recruit its own employees, is a popular hiring practice. Yet, causal evidence on the impacts of delegation in hiring on firm performance remains scarce. We run a field experiment in a retail network of 111 stores in China, where we delegate full hiring power in treatment stores. In control group stores, managers are partially delegated recruiting power: they are allowed to recruit employees only when the central HR is unable to fill job vacancies in time.

The first main outcome is employees' demographic characteristics. We choose to target this outcome, because both the firm and Co-PIs are interested in the types of employees preferred by the HR department and local store managers. The second main outcome is individual sales records. One defining feature of our studied setting is the availability of productivity records both at individual and store levels. This allows us to compare the quality of new hires under the treated and control settings. The third main outcome is employee attrition and tenure. We choose to target turnover with our experimental treatment because our studied firm suffers from high turnovers for years and incurs significant costs. Therefore, it seems interesting to investigate whether local hires' tenure is longer, and whether delegated local hiring can reduce turnovers. Finally, we explore the impacts of delegation in hiring on store-level performances (sales, employee satisfaction, etc.).

The stores are divided into one treatment and one control group. Managers of the treated stores are granted full hiring autonomy over 12 months. The experiment starts at the beginning of Sep. 2018.

Experimental design

For large chain businesses, local managers are granted various degrees of hiring autonomy from the headquarter. Delegation in hiring, when the managers of a local branch or store are empowered to recruit its own employees, is a popular hiring practice. Yet, causal evidence on the impacts of delegation in hiring on firm performance remains scarce. We run a field experiment in a retail network of 111 stores in China, where we delegate full hiring power in treatment stores. In control group stores, managers are partially delegated recruiting power: they are allowed to recruit employees only when the central HR is unable to fill job vacancies in time.

The first main outcome is employees' demographic characteristics. We choose to target this outcome, because both the firm and Co-PIs are interested in the types of employees preferred by the HR department and local store managers. The second main outcome is individual sales records. One defining feature of our studied setting is the availability of productivity records both at individual and store levels. This allows us to compare the quality of new hires under the treated and control settings. The third main outcome is employee attrition and tenure. We choose to target turnover with our experimental treatment because our studied firm suffers from high turnovers for years and incurs significant costs. Therefore, it seems interesting to investigate whether local hires' tenure is longer, and whether delegated local hiring can reduce turnovers. Finally, we explore the impacts of delegation in hiring on store-level performances (sales, employee satisfaction, etc.). We give out extra surveys to learn about the mechanisms behind the observed treatment effects, and the perceptions of the hiring policies among store managers.

The stores are divided into one treatment and one control group. Managers of the treated stores are granted full hiring autonomy over 12 months. The experiment starts at the beginning of Sep. 2018.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer
Randomization unit
Stores
Clusters
111 (=number of stores)
Observations
111
Arms
55 in treatment, 56 in the control group
Primary outcomes
Employee demographic characteristics Employee productivity (sales) Personnel turnover and tenure Store performance data (e.g. sales, employee satisfaction)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords