Technology, audit risk, and retail tax evasion: Evidence from an experiment in Rwanda
How to cite
Zeitlin, Andrew; Gerard, Francois; Eissa, Nada. 2019. "Technology, audit risk, and retail tax evasion: Evidence from an experiment in Rwanda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004164. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4164-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A central question for a country's economic development is how to improve the state's ability to raise revenues domestically in the presence of widespread tax evasion (Besley and Persson, 2009). In this context, the Value Added Tax (VAT) has become one of the most important instruments of revenue mobilization in the developing world. In principle, a VAT has several advantages in terms of tax compliance compared to other tax instruments, as it incentivizes accurate reporting of sales and purchases. Firms are essentially taxed on the difference between their sales and the cost of their inputs, and they must report both to the tax authority and keep a paper trail of the transactions (i.e., receipts) in their books. To minimize tax liability, firms would like to under-report sales, but to over-report inputs. This asymmetry should limit the room for "collusive evasion" in the case of business-to-business transactions, i.e., collusion between firms in misreporting transaction values. The existence of a paper trail should also deter "unilateral evasion", i.e., firms unilaterally misreporting transaction values, as the tax authority could crosscheck the values reported by a firm with records from third parties (i.e., suppliers and clients).
Pomeranz (2015) provided empirical evidence showing the importance of these properties of the VAT for tax compliance. Yet, in practice, limited enforcement capacity may prevent tax authorities from efficiently cross-checking what firms report against records from third parties, and thus limit unilateral evasion. To address this concern, several countries around the world, including Rwanda, have mandated the use of Electronic Billing Machines (EBMs), which generate a unique "hard-to-tamper-with" receipt for each transaction and send information on each receipt to the tax authority on a regular basis (e.g., in real time or daily). This technology limits the ability of firms to unilaterally misreport a transaction once a receipt for that transaction has been issued, which can be particularly effective for business-to-business transactions as firms have an incentive to ask for receipts for their input transactions (to decrease their tax liability). Eissa and Zeitlin (2015) show the roll-out of EBMs improved compliance in Rwanda.
However, final consumers do not have similar incentives to ask for receipts, so firms can more easily under-report sales to final consumers, an issue that can persist with EBMs if firms do not actually issue receipts to final consumers. Eissa and Zeitlin (2015) also document that firms failed to issue receipts in a large share of a sample of retail transactions made after the EBM roll-out in Rwanda. One potential policy response is to incentivize consumers to ask for receipts, e.g., with lotteries and tax rebates based on consumers’ receipts. Naritomi (AER forthcoming) provides evidence that such policies can effectively reduce the under-reporting of sales to final consumers. However, these policies can be quite expensive, as incentives have to be paid to all consumers.
Alternatively, governments can address this "last-mile" problem of the VAT with audits and related enforcement strategies at the retail level. In this light, Electronic Billing Machines can be seen as a technology that changes the cost of such enforcement strategies: by requiring firms to keep electronic accounts, they make it readily visible whether a firm is planning to declare revenue associated with a given transaction. This suggests that tax authorities can combat tax evasion by auditing firms' use of EBMs through unannounced visits, in which staff of the tax authority stop consumers leaving a store, check whether they were issued a valid EBM receipt, and apply penalties in case of non-compliance.
This study investigates the impact of such an enforcement strategy through a randomized control trial conducted in collaboration with the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA) with the aim of answering three questions:
1. What are the impacts of such an enforcement strategy on retailers' issuance of receipts, reporting of sales, and tax liability?
2. What is the impact of the associated increase in retailers' tax compliance on prices, i.e., what is the incidence on retailers vs. consumers?
3. Do firms' responses to audit risk depend on the audit risk of their competitors, i.e., does the impact of the treatment vary with the rate of treatment saturation among competitors?
The answer to the first question will allow us to evaluate the effectiveness of a policy to address the last-mile problem that is complementary to the EBM technology. The second question is important conceptually to understand the effects of enforcement policies and the possible public support for these policies. There is very little evidence on the incidence of tax evasion (Kopczuk et al., 2016). To the extent that the evasion rents are broadly shared with consumers (through lower retail prices), policies aiming to reduce tax evasion may face little support in the public as the cost of such policies (higher retail prices) may be more salient than their possible benefits (possible gains from increased government revenue). The answer to the third question is important to shed light on the mechanisms behind our answer to the second question. The ability of retailers to pass the costs associated with stronger tax enforcement onto prices likely depends on the competitive structure of the market in which they operate (e.g., monopoly, monopolistic competition, perfect competition) and on whether their competitors are also subject to the same costs. This is important because experimental enforcement interventions, such as the one we study, often focus on a subset of firms (e.g., often treat competing firms differently) but hope to inform the effect that such interventions could have when applied more broadly (e.g., treating all competing firms similarly).
In practice, this project evaluates the impact of an RRA initiative to send auditors to make surprise visits to retail firms in Kigali over a 10-month period and to observe whether ordinary consumers of those retailers are receiving receipts for their transaction. The evaluation combines innovations in measurement -- we combine VAT declarations with both real-time data on the universe of transactions reported through EBMs and receipt outcomes from natural transactions conducted by "mystery shoppers" sent to control and treatment firms throughout the study period for research purposes only -- with two dimensions of experimental variation: at the firm level, firms are assigned to (zero or) variable frequencies of audit, and across firms, we vary the saturation of the treatment among economic competitors to study strategic complementarities.
Intervention
The intervention that we evaluate in this project is a new enforcement strategy conducted by the RRA. Concretely, RRA auditors make surprise visits to specific retail firms in Kigali on a frequent basis (the frequency of those visits varies experimentally across retailers, see below), stop customers leaving the retail shop, and ask to see their EBM receipt. If a valid EBM receipt is provided by the customer, the RRA auditor records the retailer as "compliant" for this visit. If the customer does not provide a valid EBM receipt, the RRA auditor enters the retail shop and consults the retailer's EBM directly for a record of the transaction. If no such record exists (i.e., no EBM receipt was issued), the RRA auditor records the retailer as "non-compliant" for this visit, which entails a set of warnings and penalties specified in the Rwandan legislation (the severity of penalties is increasing in the number of non-compliant visits recorded for a given retailer).
Treatment and control firms were visited by an RRA auditor prior to the start of the intervention, between September 2017 and November 2017, and handed a formal letter from the RRA. The letter reminded firms about their rights and responsibilities as VAT-paying firms, especially regarding the use of EBMs, and usual enforcement strategies. The 375 treated firms were also informed about the new enforcement strategy and the expected frequency of visits per month that they would be subject to in subsequent months (2 visits per month for 284 firms; 4 visits per month for 91 firms). Among control firms, 74 firms did not receive any pre-intervention visit by the RRA (and thus did not receive any letter). This will allow us to separate the effect of the RRA visit/letter and the effect of the enforcement intervention (EBM use audits) itself.
The intervention lasted from November 2017 to September 2018. During that period, RRA auditors conducted the EBM use audits in treated firms following the expected number of visits per month announced to each firm (accompanied by an enumerator from the research team who recorded various aspects of each audit, including the compliance outcome).
Experimental design
631 VAT-registered firms were identified for inclusion in the study. The threshold for VAT eligibility is an annual turnover in excess of RWF 20 million per year, or RWF 5 million per quarter. At the time of the study, all VAT-registered firms had been issued with EBMs. Starting from the administrative universe of VAT-registered firms, inclusion criteria were as follows:
1. Firms with VAT filings dating back to at least the first quarter of 2016, to avoid potentially high business failure rates among new, small businesses that might create high rates of attrition;
2. Single-location firms based in the city of Kigali, to avoid the risk that firms might shift business across locations in response to an intervention;
3. Firms in a relevant economic sector, which excludes wholesale, repair, and cleaning activities, as well as a small number of miscellaneous or unidentifiable types;
4. Firms with at least 5 percent of EBM-receipted transactions under RWF 6,000 in value, since this was the intended value of our own 'mystery shopper' measurement activities; and
5. Firms that could be located by a team of enumerators, guided by local ('zone'-level) RRA officers.
All firms meeting these criteria were included in the study.
The process of assigning the 631 firms comprising the study population to audit treatment arms was designed to generate the same treatment probabilities for all firms, while inducing patterns of correlation across the network of firms that would facilitate an analysis of spillovers. The compound lottery that this assignment mechanism produced assigned firms to 'treatment' with probability 0.6 and to 'control' with probability 0.4.
375 firms were randomly assigned to the audit treatment. These were then assigned (by simple randomization) to two groups, characterized by varying frequency of audits:
- 284 firms were assigned to receive an expected number of 2 visits per month;
- 91 firms were assigned to receive an expected number of 4 visits per month;
256 firms were randomly assigned to the control group. These were then assigned (again by simple randomization) to two groups:
- 182 received a pre-intervention visit by the RRA (see Intervention section);
- 74 firms did not receive any pre-intervention visit at all.
These assignments were in practice achieved through a two-stage saturation design that takes advantage of knowledge of firms' connections in product and geographic space and anticipates an Athey, Eckles, and Imbens (2018) approach to inference on a connected network of firms. This design provides an assignment strategy that will be well powered under that approach to testing interference hypotheses (see our pre-analysis plan).
Design details
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