Wealth Effects and Demand for Probabilistic Insurance

How to cite

Hillebrandt, Marc-Andre; Steinorth, Petra. 2019. "Wealth Effects and Demand for Probabilistic Insurance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004106. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4106-2.0

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Marc-Andre Hillebrandt* , Petra Steinorth

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004106
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4106-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-04-15 – 2019-06-19
Countries
Germany (Hamburg)
JEL codes
D91, D81, C91, G22, G41, C55
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4106

Abstract

This study examines the effect of different wealth levels on insurance demand for probabilistic insurance contracts. Previous research has shown that even the existence of very small default probabilities lead to a sharp decrease in individuals’ willingness to pay. In addition to wealth effects, we also investigate the impact of cognitive effort and financial literacy on the demand for probabilistic insurance.

Intervention

In a previous task, individuals are equipped with different endowments. Then, they are confronted with an investment decision that is actually played out, resulting in different wealth levels. Afterwards, all subjects will answer the same set of questions regarding insurance demand with different default probabilities (but in randomized order).

Experimental design

Most studies (such as Wakker et al. (1997), and Zimmer et al. (2009)) testing the hypothesis of probabilistic insurance so far used hypothetical payoffs. Zimmer et al. (2018) were the first to conduct an incentive-compatible experiment using real monetary payoffs. In their study, subjects were able to insure themselves against a potentially high loss. In contrast, the value to be insured in our study is relatively low. Subjects are exposed to the risk of a loss of 3,500 Talers. This occurs with a probability of 5%. Afterwards, three insurance contracts will be presented (in random order to avoid an order effect), which only differ in the probability of default, namely 0%, 0.1%, and 1% default probability. Subjects are asked to state their maximum willingness to pay. Since all subjects will be incentivized, they should state their true willingness to pay.
Prior to this insurance decision, subjects are equipped with different endowments and execute an investment task following Gneezy and Potters (1997) (see AEA RCT Registry “Relative Wealth Placement and Risk-Taking Behavior” [currently under review, we will edit this and replace it with a link given a positive review] for more details). As a result, two individuals can subsequently achieve the same wealth level, even though they have shown different levels of risk aversion previously. This way, we hope to disentangle wealth effects from other confounding effects such as risk aversion, cognitive effort, financial literacy, and other sociodemographic factors like gender.

Design details

Randomization method
All subjects will be recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014). Further randomization will be done by oTree software.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
18 experimental sessions
Observations
432 subjects
Arms
144 subjects beginning to state their willingness to pay for insurance given default probabilities of 0%, 0.1%, and 1%, respectively
Primary outcomes
Investigation of willingness to pay for probabilistic insurance coverage given different wealth levels

Cited by

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Keywords