Barriers to investment in management training: Experimental evidence from middle and large Ethiopian firms

How to cite

Dupas, Pascaline; Fafchamps, Marcel; Caria, Sfefano; Abebe, Girum. 2019. "Barriers to investment in management training: Experimental evidence from middle and large Ethiopian firms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004095. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4095-1.0

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Pascaline Dupas* , Marcel Fafchamps , Sfefano Caria , Girum Abebe

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004095
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4095-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2019-04-01 – 2021-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4095

Abstract

A growing literature suggests that the lack of quality management keeps many developing country firms at a low level of productivity. Why don’t firms invest in the general management skills of their workers? A possible reason is that employers may capture only part of the benefits of training because trained managers get recruited by other firms. In this project, we test whether turnover risk contributes to low firm investment in managerial training through an RCT with a sample of firms in and around Addis Ababa. This work is done in conjunction with the collection of a longitudinal dataset.

Intervention

See Experimental Design

Experimental design

We test whether firms in Ethiopia are more interested to train their middle managers when expected turnover is experimentally lowered.

Top manager of firms involved in the SEDRI panel dataset will be invited to participate in a lottery to access a program that supports the training of middle managers at a local training institute. The institute offers weekend and evening courses in management and leadership targeted to professional managers. To participate in the lottery, the top manager has to complete and return a nomination form by a known deadline. The module contains several questions about the middle managers nominated for training and about the firm. We define “take-up” of the lottery as follows: completion of the nomination form and its delivery to implementing partner. We define take-up of the training as follows: whether the firm pays the training fee (subsidized) and send the manager to the training if they win the lottery. We will consider take-up of the lottery as our primary measure of interest in management training, assuming that take-up of the training among the winners will be large. We will measure take-up of the training for validation purposes.

Firms who win the lottery will get (i) a sizeable discount on the price of up to three training courses, and (ii) a guarantee that the trained managers will be eligible to receive lump-sum payments one year and two years after the end of the training. We introduce two treatment arms. In one treatment arm (“retention”), this payment to the manager is conditional on remaining employed at the firm that initially sponsored their training. In the other arm (“unconditional”), there is no such condition: trained managers receive the lump-sum payments unconditionally. Variation in bonus conditionality aims to generate change in expected manager turnover and hence in the training benefit that can be expected by the firm. In addition, we also vary the level of the training subsidy in order to assess willingness to pay for such training and identify financial constraints to take-up. We cross-randomize bonus conditionality and level of the subsidy, resulting in six different experimental conditions.

Design details

Randomization method
We rely on an existing panel dataset data of about 1,200 medium to large firms in the periphery of Addis Ababa – the SEDRI panel survey. All firms surveyed in 2017 will be randomly assigned to one of the treatment arms. To be offered the intervention, a firm has to have at least one middle manager at the time of our interview in 2019. We plan to add firms to this sample through a snowball method to ensure a sample size of about 1,200 firms despite potential attrition in the 2017 sample. Firms will be allocated to one of the six experimental conditions using a matched randomization procedure. We first construct groups of six firms that minimize the Mahalanobis distance over a set of eight variables measured during the 2017 survey (or the 2019 survey for firms in the snowball sample). These variables include: firm size, firm age, sector of activity, distance from the training institution, eligibility score, wages, access to manager training, and turnover rate. We then randomly allocate one firm in each group to each one of the six experimental conditions.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit is the firm.
Clusters
NA
Observations
In 2017, 827 firms had at least one middle manager. We expect that this figure will be larger in 2019. We plan to add firms to the SEDRI sample to increase the sample if needed.
Arms
We plan to allocate half of the observations to the unconditional bonus condition and the remaining half to the retention bonus condition. One third of the observation in each experimental condition will then be assigned to, respectively, the low, medium and high level of the training discount.
Primary outcomes
- Training take-up; - Characteristics of managers nominated for training.
Secondary outcomes
- Training courses chosen.

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Keywords