Barriers to investment in management training: Experimental evidence from middle and large Ethiopian firms
How to cite
Dupas, Pascaline; Fafchamps, Marcel; Caria, Sfefano; Abebe, Girum. 2019. "Barriers to investment in management training: Experimental evidence from middle and large Ethiopian firms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004095. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4095-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A growing literature suggests that the lack of quality management keeps many developing country firms at a low level of productivity. Why don’t firms invest in the general management skills of their workers? A possible reason is that employers may capture only part of the benefits of training because trained managers get recruited by other firms. In this project, we test whether turnover risk contributes to low firm investment in managerial training through an RCT with a sample of firms in and around Addis Ababa. This work is done in conjunction with the collection of a longitudinal dataset.
Intervention
See Experimental Design
Experimental design
We test whether firms in Ethiopia are more interested to train their middle managers when expected turnover is experimentally lowered.
Top manager of firms involved in the SEDRI panel dataset will be invited to participate in a lottery to access a program that supports the training of middle managers at a local training institute. The institute offers weekend and evening courses in management and leadership targeted to professional managers. To participate in the lottery, the top manager has to complete and return a nomination form by a known deadline. The module contains several questions about the middle managers nominated for training and about the firm. We define “take-up” of the lottery as follows: completion of the nomination form and its delivery to implementing partner. We define take-up of the training as follows: whether the firm pays the training fee (subsidized) and send the manager to the training if they win the lottery. We will consider take-up of the lottery as our primary measure of interest in management training, assuming that take-up of the training among the winners will be large. We will measure take-up of the training for validation purposes.
Firms who win the lottery will get (i) a sizeable discount on the price of up to three training courses, and (ii) a guarantee that the trained managers will be eligible to receive lump-sum payments one year and two years after the end of the training. We introduce two treatment arms. In one treatment arm (“retention”), this payment to the manager is conditional on remaining employed at the firm that initially sponsored their training. In the other arm (“unconditional”), there is no such condition: trained managers receive the lump-sum payments unconditionally. Variation in bonus conditionality aims to generate change in expected manager turnover and hence in the training benefit that can be expected by the firm. In addition, we also vary the level of the training subsidy in order to assess willingness to pay for such training and identify financial constraints to take-up. We cross-randomize bonus conditionality and level of the subsidy, resulting in six different experimental conditions.
Design details
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