Anti-Competitive Entry. Theory and Evidence from a Lab Experiment

How to cite

Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Moen, Espen R.; Helland, Leif. 2019. "Anti-Competitive Entry. Theory and Evidence from a Lab Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004094. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4094-1.6000000000000005

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Tom-Reiel Heggedal* , Espen R. Moen , Leif Helland

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004094
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4094-1.6000000000000005
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-04-08 – 2019-04-25
Countries
Denmark (), Norway ()
JEL codes
L1; C7; C9
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4094

Abstract

We model anti-competitive effects of entry within a search framework, and test the implications in an experiment in which the presence of entry (Y/N) and the share of uninformed buyers (15%;30%;60%) constitute the treatments. In our pilot study we observe prices that are broadly consistent with our theoretical findings.

We added a treatment in January 2020. This treatment increased the size of a market from three to six sellers in the entry condition with 30% uninformed buyers. Data collection for the added treatment is planned to take place at the LEE lab (Econ department/University of Copenhagen week 10/2020). Apart from the market size, the added treatment is identical to the first six treatments. The aim is to test the proposition that the market size does not impact on price setting. Like the other treatments we collect data on 8 matching blocks for the added treatment.

The study is a randomized contolled trail performed in the Laboratory. The treatments in the no-entry condition (coreresponding to the "Model of Sales" by Hal Varian, AER 1980) serves as Control treatments.

Experimental design

Posted prices; three human sellers; 100 robot buyers. Treatments A) Entry/No entry; B) # of uninformed buyers (15%;30%;60%)

Design details

Randomization method
In office by computer
Randomization unit
Matching blocks consisting of 3 markets of 3 human sellers each; randomly re-matched within blocks over 60 periods.1
Clusters
48 matching blocks
Observations
432 unique subjects (between subjects design)
Arms
432 unique subjects
Primary outcomes
Posted prices; distribution of posted prices.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords