Greener on the Other Side? Inequity and Property Tax Collection
How to cite
Best, Michael; Gerard, Francois; Zoratto, Laura; Kresch, Evan; Naritomi, Joana. 2019. "Greener on the Other Side? Inequity and Property Tax Collection." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004055. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4055-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project works with the government of the city of Manaus, Brazil to improve compliance with the municipal property tax. Specifically, we aim to understand the role that inequity -- similar households being treated differently by tax policy -- plays in determining compliance with the tax. We do this by combining a novel survey experiment raising the salience of horizontal inequity with rich administrative data on tax liabilities and tax compliance.
Intervention
We will conduct a survey experiment in a sample of 9,000 households located along tax sector boundaries in February and March 2019 (first payments of tax bills are due in mid March).
The survey experiment is designed to study the impact of two treatments. Our main treatment will inform property owners of how the tax system works and how their tax liability compares to their neighbors on the other side of the tax sector boundary. The experiment informs property owners that there is inequity in the system and that they are treated better (for those on the low tax side) or worse (for those on the high tax side) than comparable peers. The second treatment highlights key tools the government has available to enforce the payment of the property tax by households.
We will then measure self-reported and actual tax compliance to test for the existence of peer-comparison effects, and separately for advantageous equity and disadvantageous equity effects, in the taxation context. We will also test for impacts on policy preferences.
Experimental design
Sampling
There are approximately 600,000 taxable properties in Manaus. Our government partners shared their cadaster with us, anonymizing each property such that for each property, the finest level at which it could be identified is the lot the property is on. There are 456,000 lots in the data. We identified all lots that are on blocks that are either adjacent to the boundary of a tax sector or adjacent to a block that is adjacent to a tax boundary to form a buffer two blocks deep around the boundaries of the tax sectors.
Within these blocks, we drop non-residential properties, apartment buildings (entering apartment buildings requires the superintendent's written permission, complicating surveying significantly), and blocks where the average tax change for residential properties were they to be located on the other side of their closest tax boundary is either less than 4% or less than 15 Reais. This results in a sample of 39,306 properties on 32,908 lots.
Randomization.
We randomized the lots into 6 treatments.
1- Control survey; Short list first (in list randomization)
2- Control survey; Long list first (in list randomization)
3- Enforcement treatment survey; Short list first (in list randomization)
4- Enforcement treatment survey; Long list first (in list randomization)
5- Fairness treatment survey; Short list first (in list randomization)
6- Fairness treatment survey; Long list first (in list randomization)
We stratified the randomization into 40 strata, combining
1- 2 groups for above and below median delinquency in 2017.
2- 4 groups for quartiles of the size of the tax liability.
3- 5 groups for the size of the tax jump. For the negative jumps (people on the high tax side of the boundary) we split them into the 40% largest negative jumps (group 1), the next 40% (group 2) and the 20% smallest negative tax jumps. Similarly for the positive tax jumps (people on the low tax side of the boundary) we split them into the 40% largest positive jumps (group 3), the next 40% (group 4) and the 20% smallest positive tax jumps. The 20% smallest positive and negative tax jumps combined to create group 5.
We then randomized the lots into the 6 treatments, with probabilities that varied with the strata depending on the tax jump stratum the lot was in. In the strata with small tax jumps (group 5) we randomized 50% of lots into the enforcement treatment and 50% into the control survey. In the strata with the large (positive or negative) tax jumps we randomized 20% of lots into the enforcement treatment, 40% of lots into the fairness treatment, and 40% into the control survey. These proportions were picked to maximize overall power subject to the constraint that no lots in the small tax jump group would receive the fairness treatment.
Design details
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