Social identity, taste bias and under provisioning of public goods

How to cite

BANERJEE, RITWIK; Chakraborty, Anujit; Dutta, Ashokankur; Chaudhuri, Arka Roy. 2020. "Social identity, taste bias and under provisioning of public goods." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004047. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4047-1.1

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RITWIK BANERJEE* , Anujit Chakraborty , Ashokankur Dutta , Arka Roy Chaudhuri

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004047
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4047-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-03-01 – 2021-04-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
H4 H8 O1
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4047

Abstract

Data shows that public good provision in India decreases with an increase in caste based fractionalization. While past research documents this association, the causal interpretation and the deeper mechanisms driving the result is an open question. This project aims to plug this gap by identifying the precise causal connection between caste fractionalization in India and under provisioning of public goods using an artefactual field experiment. Further, it aims to examine if higher fractionalization leads to lower co-consumption of public good due to distaste for the social other. To give an example, suppose people from different castes need to coordinate to build a well or lobby with local authorities to build that well. In a more caste wise fractured village, people may be less likely to coordinate and build the well because they have a distaste for sharing the public good with outgroup members. This form of associative distaste is markedly different from free riding, the dominant theme examined in the context of public good provision. Participants from Upper Castes and Scheduled Castes play a public good game under three treatment and two compositional conditions. In Treatment 1 they play it with money, while in Treatment 2 and 3 they play the game with biriyani (a delightful self contained meal consumed in many parts of India). In Treatment 2 participants can carry the food back home while in Treatment 3 they co-consume the food at the venue. Each treatment is played with only Upper Caste, only Scheduled Caste and mixed participants. Our experimental design allows us to separate free riding and unwillingness to share owing to associative distaste as two plausible reasons behind underprovision of public goods, through lab-in-the-field experiments conducted in rural areas in the Indian state of Bihar.

Experimental design

The experiment will involve male participants in the age group of 18-35 years, selected from the sampled villages of Patna-Rural district of Bihar, India. Participants or subjects will be selected from Upper Caste and Scheduled Caste categories. Each session will consist of three to four groups of four individuals playing a simple public good game: every player will be given a fixed amount of money/goods and will be asked to contribute towards a common pool. The treatment variations are along two basic dimensions: the composition of the group and the nature of the good in terms of which the endowment and pay-offs are defined. We now discuss the two differentiating criteria in more details.
In homogenous sessions, all four subjects participating in the session will be from the same caste group, either Upper Caste (UC, henceforth) or Scheduled Caste (SC, henceforth). In heterogeneous sessions, two of the players will belong to the SC category, while the remaining two will be from UC category. The caste composition in each group will be common knowledge, though the game itself will be anonymously played.
A standard money based public good game cannot possibly invoke associative distaste since the act of sharing itself is absent. As a result, we introduce a variant of the public good game where subjects play with biriyani (a delightful self-contained meal with substantial aspiration value in India) instead of money. a substantial aspiration value in India. Thus, in our experiment there will be three kinds of goods in terms of which sessions will be differentiated.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be done at the site of experiment by a computer.
Randomization unit
Randomization will be done at the session level. Each session will be randomly assigned to one of the treatments.
Clusters
110 sessions, each with 16 subjects. In our case, a session will assume the role of a cluster.
Observations
1800 subjects
Arms
7 sessions per treatment arm, with 16 subjects in each.
Primary outcomes
Contribution in the public good game. Beliefs about how much others will contribute.
Sponsors
Name: International Growth Center Location: London, UK Url: https://www.theigc.org/

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Keywords