Inequality, Information, and European Income Tax Policy Preferences
How to cite
Ballard-Rosa, Cameron; Thor, Nicolaj; Scheve, Kenneth; Rogowski, Ronald. 2019. "Inequality, Information, and European Income Tax Policy Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004044. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4044-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
It is well known that economic inequality has risen in many democratic states over the last several decades; yet there is little evidence that these states have responded with tax and transfer policies that would significantly mitigate the impact of these changes on post-tax and transfer outcomes (e.g., Bonica et al. 2013). The lack of a policy response to rising inequality has two broad interpretations. The first is that democracy is failing to deliver the policies that voters want, either because of representation failures (due, e.g., to money in politics) or because states are constrained by efficiency considerations from meeting voter demands (Gilens 2012). The second is that voters do not necessarily want rising inequality to be corrected by more generous tax and transfer policies (Ballard-Rosa, Martin & Scheve 2017). One obviously important way to assess the relative strengths of these two interpretations is to determine what the policy preferences of voters are and whether they are influenced by information about inequality. Our proposal focuses on these questions.
The tax system is one of the most powerful tools with which states can influence inequality. A key characteristic of modern tax systems is that they are multidimensional -- countries can tax different types of economic activities, including income, wealth, property, and consumption; and they often choose to tax different levels of each of these at different rates. This creates a challenge for characterizing the policy preferences of voters over the tax system and in particular its features, such as progressivity, that influence its impact on inequality.
In this research, we propose fielding a conjoint survey experiment on a representative sample of adults in Germany to study tax rate preferences across the income distribution while taking account of the impact that alternative tax plans have on total revenue raised. Our methodology not only allows us to characterize how popular alternative rates are but provides evidence of the elasticities of support for income tax plans with varying rates across the income distribution, and for taxes on income versus ones on consumption (e.g., VAT). These elasticities of public support have wide-ranging implications for the political feasibility of varying tax policy reforms.
In addition to employing an innovative methodology to measure multi-dimensional tax preferences, the research proposed here will also investigate the impact of inequality on tax policy preferences. Prior research on the question of how, or even whether, inequality affects redistributive preferences, including tax policy, is primarily observational. Researchers have investigated cross-sectional correlations of support for redistribution, or for taxing high incomes, with national or sub-national inequality, and some have traced such correlations over time (Alt & Iversen 2017, Kelly & Enns 2010, Lupu & Pontusson 2011, Moene & Wallerstein 2001). While informative, these studies are often difficult to interpret because levels, and even changes, in inequality (and certainly perceptions of either) are endogenous to policy and policy opinions.
Intervention
Voluntary adults (18+) in Germany recruited by YouGov will be contacted and asked to complete an online survey from their computer or cell phone. The survey will include a number of informational interventions dealing with the extent of inequality in society, as detailed below.
Experimental design
Beyond the conjoint experiment described above, respondents will also be exposed to a set of “informational treatments” regarding the extent of inequality in their society. These informational treatments build off prior work by Kuziemko et al. (2015), which has demonstrated the effects of information on inequality on American respondents’ political preferences.
More precisely, each respondent will be randomly exposed to one of four informational treatments, or instead will receive no additional information (control). Each of the informational treatments is detailed immediately below:
Module A (“Personal inequality - Earn less”):
Respondents will first be asked to enter their “gross monthly individual income before taxes.” After entering this information, the survey will display the following text: “X% of German individuals who have incomes earn less than you.” In this instance, X% will be populated based on data derived from the LIS on the current distribution of income in Germany.
Module B (“Personal inequality - Earn more”):
Respondents will first be asked to enter their “gross monthly individual income before taxes.” After entering this information, the survey will display the following text: “X% of German individuals who have incomes earn more than you.” In this instance, X% will be populated based on data derived from the LIS on the current distribution of income in Germany.
Module C (“Societal inequality – Top/Middle”):
Respondents will be presented with the following statement: “In 2015, German individuals with incomes in the top 1% earned at least 124,997 euros annually before taxes while German individuals with incomes in the middle of the income distribution (where half of individuals earned more, and half less) earned 21,000 euros annually. This means that in 2015 the ratio between the top 1% of earners and those at exactly the middle was 5.95.”
Module D (“Societal inequality – Top/Bottom”):
Respondents will be presented with the following statement: “In 2015, German individuals with incomes in the top 1% earned at least 124,997 euros annually before taxes while German individuals with incomes near the bottom of the income distribution (bottom 10%) earned at most 4,536 euros annually. This means that in 2015 the ratio between the top 1% of earners and the bottom 10% was 27.56.”
Control Module
Respondents assigned to the control condition will not be presented with any additional information prior to moving to the next section of the survey.
To help us interpret the mechanisms driving the expected treatment effects in the analysis, we plan an eliminated effect experiment at the end of our survey. Specifically, we seek to determine if the impact of information about inequality has its impact because respondents have an ability-to-pay fairness criterion in which it is viewed as fair to tax the rich at a higher rate because they are better ability to afford it.
The respondents will be randomly assigned into one of the four following conditions:
CONDITION A
[CONTROL, NO INTRODUCTION]
CONDITION B
In 2015, 0.01% of Germans who earned income earned one million euros or more. This income is 48 times the median German income of 21,000 euros per year.
CONDITION C
Some argue that tax systems should have higher rates for those with higher incomes becomes high earners have a greater ability to pay and therefore the higher rates equalize sacrifice in the tax system.
CONDITION D
In 2015, 0.01% of Germans who earned income earned one million euros or more. This income is 48 times the median German income of 21,000 euros per year. Some argue that tax systems should have higher rates for those with higher incomes becomes high earners have a greater ability to pay and therefore the higher rates equalize sacrifice in the tax system.
They then will be asked a new outcome question eliciting their preferred tax rate for respondents who make more than one million euros per year.
We will then estimate the eliminated effect as in (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2018).
Design details
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