Coordination and Information Acquisition: An Experiment
How to cite
Goryunov, Maxim; Rigos, Alexandros. 2019. "Coordination and Information Acquisition: An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004039. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4039-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
There are numerous instances where people can only achieve their goals by coordinating their actions. Examples range from friends choosing a place for an evening out, through traders on financial and foreign exchange markets, to protesters against a political regime. The resulting coordination game that is often used to model such situations has multiple equilibria under complete information. Yet, information is rarely complete and the structure of the game is rarely a common knowledge. Even if a trader knows the fundamental value of a stock he can never be sure that it is also known to other traders, and a citizen going to an anti-government march can only guess how many people will gather on the streets. Moreover, in many of those situations information is not exogenous to the decision, and agents can choose to learn about fundamentals.
This leads to the question of how information acquisition affects game equilibria, and ultimately the agents' behaviour. Morris and Yang (2016) argue that uniqueness of the equilibrium is tightly connected to the technology of information acquisition. They show that a coordination game has a unique equilibrium whenever it is sufficiently easier to distinguish states that are further apart than nearby ones. Our goal is to test their insight experimentally.
Experimental design
Participants in the experiment are randomly matched into pairs to play a coordination game. Each of them has a choice of two actions: either participate (P) in the project or abstain (A). Abstention generates fixed payoff (riskless action). Payoff from participation (risky action) depends on the unknown state of the world and the other participant's choice. Treatment vary in the way in which participants are provided with information about the unknown, payoff-relevant state of the world. Specifically, in the Continuous Treatment (CT), information provision induces continuous probability of choice of the risky action. In the Discontinuous Treatment (DT), information provision allows for discontinuity in the choice probability of the risky action. The main interest is in the differences in behavior between CT and DT.
Design details
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