Bureaucrats vs. Politicians: A Field Experiment on Political Oversight over Bureaucrats
How to cite
Raffler, Pia. 2015. "Bureaucrats vs. Politicians: A Field Experiment on Political Oversight over Bureaucrats." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000402. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.402-7.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Local bureaucrats are crucial for service delivery. In many developing countries, they operate in settings with weak oversight institutions and high levels of information asymmetries, further contributing to suboptimal levels of public services. One important, yet understudied, mechanism to hold them accountable is political oversight. The effects of political oversight over bureaucrats on the quality of service delivery are ambiguous. On the one hand, a growing body of empirical evidence finds that in particular in settings of weak institutions elected officials are often more accountable than their appointed counterparts, suggesting that increased political oversight may have positive effects. On the other hand, the literature points to several reasons why bureaucratic insulation may be beneficial, including pandering and patronage by politicians. My dissertation grapples with this ambiguity theoretically and empirically. Building on delegation theory, I formulate an original theory on the conditions under which we should expect an increase in political oversight to improve the quality of service delivery. I test the derived hypotheses through a field experiment, which I implement in collaboration with the Ugandan Ministry of Finance and ODI in 260 local governments in Uganda, by increasing the de facto oversight local politicians have over their bureaucratic counterparts, and, in a second treatment arm, their electoral incentives to use it to improve service delivery.
Intervention
The intervention is designed to increase the oversight capacity of local elected representatives over their bureaucratic counterparts. The core of the intervention is the dissemination of highly disaggregate financial information. Due to a reform in 2010, Ugandan local bureaucrats are required to report location and project specific information on local government budget allocations and expenditures to the Ministry of Finance on a quarterly basis. These figures, as well as details on the actual amounts received by local governments, are largely unknown to elected representatives and the general public.
In the first treatment arm, financial information relevant to the specific constituency is provided to elected representatives in non-technical hard copy reports on a quarterly basis. The first dissemination is accompanied by a day-long workshop for local politicians of randomly selected local governments. The curriculum of the workshop is designed to enable participants to interpret the financial information, clarify their oversight mandate, and to increase their monitoring skills. In the second treatment arm, local opinion leaders are invited to participate in the workshop and to receive the financial information together with their elected representatives.
Experimental design
Local governments (subcounties) in the sampled districts will be randomly assigned to one of three conditions:
1) Local politicians and bureaucrats are invited to attend the training workshop and receive financial information on a quarterly basis.
2) Local politicians, bureaucrats and local opinion leaders are invited to attend the training workshop and receive financial information on a quarterly basis.
3) Status quo.
Design details
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