Excuse-driven present bias

How to cite

Kaufmann, Marc; Drucker, Luca Flóra. 2019. "Excuse-driven present bias." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004010. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4010-5.3

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Marc Kaufmann* , Luca Flóra Drucker

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0004010
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4010-5.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-07-20 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D91, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4010

Abstract

In this study we measure whether and by how much people behave in a more present biased way when they can use excuses to rationalize their present-biased behavior.

Intervention

In our experiment, we measure how subjects change trading off current vs future effort when they have excuses available to them (in the form of risk) and when they have no excuses available to them. The main intervention consists in randomizing both whether an excuse is available and whether an excuse is desirable. By desirable we mean whether there is anything that the person might want to excuse, which means whether it would justify working less right now -- as opposed to justifying working less later.

Experimental design

Our design allows to estimate quantitatively how much present-biased behavior increases due to having excuses available, but it requires us to difference out the impact of risk.

Design details

Randomization method
Done by computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
In our initial pilots, we will recruit subjects from MTurk. 80 individuals for the pilot in which we test sliders vs price lists; and to calibrate the number of tasks and payment levels for the main study. We are aiming for 150-300 subjects for the main study. This will depend on: (i) How much we need to pay to ensure low level of attrition (main concern) (ii) How large difference in utility there is between doing the work today compared to tomorrow for different levels of effort The idea for point (ii) is that if subjects don't care much about the difference between working today and tomorrow (say, because it is only 5 tasks), then there may be little reason in the first place to make an excuse. If however they do care, then the incentive for excuse-making is higher. (We have no proof that this is the case, but is more plausible than assuming that subjects want to excuse the small but not the important.) Given that we will incur large fixed costs to ensure low attrition, we will almost surely benefit from cranking up our treatment effect, which we think grows with the size of what can be excused. For example: if we need to pay $15 to ensure that everyone comes back, and if we get a difference in stated utility of $0.50 vs $3 when subjects do merely 5 tasks vs 20, it may be better to have 20 tasks rather than 5 tasks, since we get a noticeable difference in utility (and thus hopefully something worth excusing), especially since the fixed costs per person are $15 + variable costs.
Observations
Based on the pilot we will determine the size of the primary and secondary designs (see power calculations).
Arms
Based on the pilot we will determine the size of the primary and secondary designs (see power calculations).
Primary outcomes
We measure how much subjects value a given option, which consists in a small probability of not having to do work in the future. Our first primary outcome is the difference in this option's value when the option can serve as an excuse compared to when it cannot. [[[Marc]]] Our second primary outcome (secondary design) is whether subjects use risk on money as an excuse to distort their trade-offs in effort allocation always in favor of working less in the present.
Secondary outcomes
Our secondary outcome is the change in our measure of present bias under the assumption that all of the change comes from a distortion of present bias -- or equivalently, if one estimated a structural model as in Augenblick and Rabin (2018) without accounting for the role of excuse-making.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords