Benefiting Now or Later – An Experimental Study of Cooperation and Punishment with Delayed Benefits
How to cite
Fischer, Fabian Johannes; Kölle, Felix. 2019. "Benefiting Now or Later – An Experimental Study of Cooperation and Punishment with Delayed Benefits." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0004006. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4006-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In many economic decision situations people are forced to make intertemporal trade-offs between costs and benefits occurring at different points in time. Numerous studies, both theoretically and empirically, have investigated these trade-offs in the context of individual decision making in which choices only affect oneself. The timing of when costs and benefits realize, however, is also important in strategic decision situations in which outcomes are interdependent. For instance, the challenges of climate change are not only characterized by a conflict of interest between individual and social efficiency, but also by the fact that the costs and benefits of the collective action occur at different points in time. Yet, so far relatively little is known about cooperative behavior in settings in which the social and the time dimension operate at the same time.
This study strives to gain insights into this question by investigating how delaying the benefits of cooperation affects collective action. It builds on a recent paper by Kölle and Lauer (2018) who find that delaying the costs (benefits) of cooperation by 12 months substantially reduces (increases) cooperation. The authors focus on a series of one-shot games to isolate the different underlying mechanisms. Many human interactions outside the lab, however, take place in repeated contexts, in which factors like reputational concerns or learning affect behavior, too. Previous evidence from static contexts shows that while cooperation typically starts out high at the beginning of repeated interactions, it typically decreases over time. If, however, people are given the opportunity to punish each other, cooperation can be stabilized as many cooperators are willing to punish free riders even at own material costs. The main aim of this study is to experimentally investigate the extent to which these insights from repeated public goods games with and without punishment translate into a context in which the benefits of cooperation are delayed into the future.
Intervention
Laboratory experiment
Treatment: Delay of benefits
Control: No delay of benefits
Experimental design
The experiment is based on a standard linear public good game in which groups of four participants repeatedly interact with each other. The matching of participants into groups is thereby held constant across all periods within one part (partner matching protocol). Two types of repeated interactions are studied, one with and one without punishment.
This basic decision setup will be tested in two different treatments: NoDelay and BenefitDelay. The treatments differ with respect to when the benefits from cooperation realize. In NoDelay, the baseline treatment, both the benefits and the costs will realize immediately, alike many previous studies. In BenefitDelay, the benefits of cooperation will be delayed by 3 months, while the costs of cooperation will realize immediately.
Design details
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