Vertical Pay Differentials and Worker Productivity: Evidence from the Health Worker Program in Sierra Leone
How to cite
DESERRANNO, ERIKA; Kastrau, Philipp; Leon, Gianmarco. 2019. "Vertical Pay Differentials and Worker Productivity: Evidence from the Health Worker Program in Sierra Leone." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003993. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3993-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We test the effect a steeper wage progression between low-tier employees (e.g., frontline service providers) and higher-tier employees (e.g. supervisors, bosses) on organizational performance, and investigate whether this effect differs in more vs. less- meritocratic promotion systems. While steep wage progression may incentivize lower-tier workers to perform better in a meritocratic regime (through career incentives), it may instead demotivate workers in a non-meritocratic regime (through fairness or inequality concerns).
We collaborate with a national public organization—the Community Health Worker Program in Sierra Leone—in which supervisors (high-tier workers) are in charge of monitoring and advising about 9 health workers each (lower-tier workers). Each time a supervisor leaves her position, one of the 9 health workers located in that “health unit” (henceforth, PHU) is promoted to the supervisor position.
Our project takes places in 372 PHUs across 6 districts of Sierra Leone. It introduces exogenous variation at the PHU level on: (1) the perceived gap between health workers’ and supervisors’ earnings (higher vs. lower perceived wage progression), and (2) the extent to which the promotion process is meritocratic or not (higher vs. lower meritocracy).
Our goal is twofold. First, we aim to test the differential effect of increasing the perceived vertical wage steepness in regimes that are more vs. less meritocratic. In particular, we are interested in understanding whether a larger vertical pay gap can motivate workers in meritocratic regimes while demotivate workers in non-meritocratic regimes. Second, we aim to test the effect of meritocratic promotions per se on worker performance, and the heterogonous effect by worker type (ability, social connections, etc.).
Intervention
This study takes place in the context of the Community Health Worker Program in Sierra Leone. The health program is structured around PHUs, each composed of one peer supervisors (PS) and an average of 9 community health workers (CHW) per PS. CHWs are the frontline workers: they are in charge of visiting households in their villages and provide basic health services: inform them about health, treat/diagnose diseases (whenever possible) and provide ante- or post-natal services. Each CHW is trained, supervised and advised by the peer supervisor (PS) in their corresponding health unit. All CHWs and PSs are entitled to a total monthly compensation of, respectively, SLL 150,000 and SLL 250,000, by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS). [$1.00 = SLL 8,450.00] When a supervisor decides to quit her position, one of the 9 health workers she supervises is promoted to the supervisor position.
Until mid-2018, promotions from CHW to PS position were made at the discretion of the head of each PHU and therefore mostly based on personal connections, rather than merit. Starting then, the District Health Officials have committed — in a random half of the 372 PHUs — to use objective performance information as the main input for their promotion decisions (“Meritocracy Treatment”). Performance will be measured through a reporting system that exists in all PHUs. All CHWs in the Meritocracy Treatment are informed about the new promotion system, while CHWs who are not assigned to the Meritocracy Treatment are reminded of the current promotion system.
The experiment further creates random variation at the PHU level in perceived wage steepness. In a random half of the PHUs (stratified by the Meritocracy Treatment), CHWs are informed about the wage gap between their own salary and the supervisor’s salary (Wage Gap Treatment), which they underestimate at baseline. In the other half of the PHUs, CHWs are not informed about the wage gap. We will quantify the effect of the Wage Gap information treatment on the exact increase in CHWs' perceived wage gap through a survey. (More details below).
Experimental design
All CHWs in 372 PHUs are randomly assigned to one in four groups of equal size (with randomization at PHU level):
(1) Control Group
(2) Meritocracy Treatment only
(3) Wage Gap Treatment only
(4) Meritocracy Treatment + Wage Gap Treatment
Design details
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