Representative Evidence on Exchange Asymmetries

How to cite

Fehr, Dietmar; Kuebler, Dorothea. 2019. "Representative Evidence on Exchange Asymmetries." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003992. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3992-3.3

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Dietmar Fehr* , Dorothea Kuebler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003992
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3992-3.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2018-09-01 – 2024-03-08
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D11
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3992

Abstract

The endowment effect describes the tendency of individuals to place greater value on objects they own than on the same or a similar object they do not own. This drives a wedge between the willingness to pay and willingness to accept for an object, or leads individuals to trade a randomly assigned object significantly less often than predicted by standard theory, resulting in an exchange asymmetry. In this project, we investigate the prevalence of exchange asymmetries in the general population and test a leading theoretical explanation.

Intervention

We implement our study in the SOEP Innovation Sample (SOEP IS, Richter and Schupp, 2015). The SOEP IS is a representative longitudinal survey of German households. Participating households receive monetary incentives for completing the surveys and, in addition, receive a small item in the beginning of a survey as appreciation for the time (household gift). We use this unique feature of the survey for our experiment and implement a modified version of the exchange paradigm introduced by Knetsch (1989).

Experimental design

Our design is based on the exchange paradigm introduced by Knetsch (1989). That is, we randomly endow households with one of two equally valued items. At the end of the household survey, interviewers offer respondents the opportunity to trade the endowed item for the alternative item. After completing trades (if any), the interviewers continue with personal questionnaires for all household members.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization through survey software
Randomization unit
First we randomize households to one of the three conditions described above and then we randomize the assignment of the two items.
Clusters
about 3,300
Observations
about 3,300. The exact number depends on panel stability.
Arms
10% of the total sample participate in the choice condition 45% in the treatment without information about the trading possibility (baseline condition) 45% in the treatment with information about the trading possibility (expectation condition)
Primary outcomes
(i) the share of respondents who keep their assigned item and (ii) the total trading rates.
Secondary outcomes
Loss aversion

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords