Gender Discrimination at the Consumer Credit Market in Chile: Experimental Evidence from a Correspondence Study with Real Borrowers
How to cite
Undurraga, Raimundo; Solis, Alex; Parrado, Eric; Montoya, Ana Maria. 2019. "Gender Discrimination at the Consumer Credit Market in Chile: Experimental Evidence from a Correspondence Study with Real Borrowers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003961. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3961-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which Chilean banks discriminate against female borrowers in the consumer credit market. By using a self-selected sample of incentivized loan applicants, we match 404 male and female profiles on demographics and credit history information (exactly the same variables used by the banks to evaluate loan applications) to build a balanced sample of applicants across gender. We then ask each applicant to send 4 loan requests through email (with random amounts and loan terms) to 4 different and randomly assigned bank executives who are in charge of selling loans to clients, for a total sample of 1,616 loan applications distributed across more than 600 bank executives. We analyze response, approval, and rejection rates across gender (external margin), as well as amount, interest rate, and term of approved loans (internal margin). We take advantage of a series of gender-preference elicitation pretests conducted to bank executives to infer whether potential differences across applicant's gender are originated on taste-based discrimination (as opposed to statistical) . Finally, we further conduct a salience experiment where emails about the importance and the prevalence of gender discrimination are sent from the governmental authority to the bank executives, so that we can test the effectiveness of information treatments on reducing gender discrimination in the consumer credit market.
Intervention
This is a randomized control trial where the treatment variable is the gender of the individual that submits the loan request to the assigned loan officer. In particular, this is an RCT implemented in the form of a corresponding study where loan officers randomly receive loan requests from either male or female borrowers according to randomization.
A secondary treatment is an information intervention where one-paragraph email about the importance and the prevalence of gender discrimination is randomly sent from the governmental authority to half of the loan officers considered for this study. Here the treatment variable is whether the loan officer receive the message or not.
Experimental design
By using a self-selected sample of incentivized loan applicants ("actors"), we match 404 male and female profiles on demographics and credit history information to build a balanced sample of actors across gender. The recruitment of actors was made based on randomly selected emails from DEMRE data, which contain detailed information about emails and test scores of people that have taken the PSU test from 2000 onward (PSU = Prueba de Seleccion Universitaria, a national test on math, verbal, etc. taken every year by any student who applies to the university system). Then, our sample is composed by relatively young professionals with short credit history. Information about incomes and employment status is obtained through wage settlements and social security contributions reports attached by the testers. Finally, data on credit history of each actor is obtained through SBIF administrative records (SBIF = Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras), the national authority for banking regulation. Overall, our prettreatment information allows us to fairly match the set of variables typically used by the banks to evaluate consumer loan applications.
Applicants are asked to send 4 loan requests through email to 4 different and randomly assigned bank executives who are in charge of selling loans to clients. Applicants receive around US$20 for sending the 4 loan applications, for a total sample of 1,616 loan applications distributed across more than 600 bank executives. Loan requests are text-standardized, but randomly vary across amount and loan term so we can test heterogeneous effects across the two dimensions. For each loan application, the actor receives the exact text and email address of the bank executive, so they copy and paste the text with the loan request and send it to the email address from their personal accounts. Responses from the executive are tracked by the actor who resend the information to the research team.
Bank executives are randomly selected from a nationally representative survey of bank executives administered through SBIF. The survey includes information on gender, education, and years of experience, as well as a series of gender-preference elicitation pretests.
Finally, we further conduct a salience experiments where an email about the importance and the prevalence of gender discrimination is randomly sent from the governmental authority to half of the loan officers included in our study, so that we can test the effectiveness of information treatments on reducing gender discrimination in the consumer credit market. The emails were sent at the beginning of the experiment to all the executives at the same time, the half of which randomly contains treatment information.
Design details
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