Peer effects, Rewards, and Image Concerns in Energy Decision (PRICED)
How to cite
Carattini, Stefano; Tavoni, Alessandro; Gosnell, Greer. 2019. "Peer effects, Rewards, and Image Concerns in Energy Decision (PRICED)." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003951. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3951-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We have partnered with a renewable energy provider to implement a field experimental study to test the effects of image concerns and financial incentives on the private adoption of renewable energy tariffs. To causally identify the effect of each intervention on behavior in the experiment, we will study the geographical distribution of customers and treat randomly selected defined geographical areas, ensuring that comparable areas are allocated across treatment and control groups. In the study proposed here, we will carefully select triplets comprised of three similar household clusters to each
receive one of the treatments. A first treatment will allow us determining the effect of social image (as defined in Benabou and Tirole, 2006) on green energy adoption and customer retention. By comparing with a second treatment, in which financial incentives are combined with social rewards, the effect of each of these two elements can be disentangled. Financial incentives may either reinforce (crowd in) or attenuate (crowd out) the effect of social rewards. Finally, the experimental design will allow us to determine the effects of the visibility of pro-social behavior on local peer adoption. Importantly, the study will allow us to generate exogenous variation in the visibility of pro-social behavior, potentially leading to additional adoption through social contagion effects.
Intervention
We have partnered with a renewable energy provider to implement a field experimental study to test the effects of image concerns and financial incentives on the private adoption of renewable energy tariffs. To causally identify the effect of each intervention on behavior in the experiment, we will study the geographical distribution of customers and treat randomly selected defined geographical areas, ensuring that comparable areas are allocated across treatment and control groups. In the study proposed here, we will carefully select triplets comprised of three similar household clusters to each receive one of the treatments. A first treatment will allow us determine the effect of social image (as defined in Benabou and Tirole, 2006) on green energy adoption and customer retention. By comparing with a second treatment, in which financial incentives are combined with social rewards, the effect of each of these two elements can be disentangled. Financial incentives may either reinforce (crowd in) or attenuate (crowd out) the effect of social rewards. Finally, the experimental design will allow us to determine the effects of the visibility of pro-social behavior on local peer adoption. Importantly, the study will allow us to generate exogenous variation in the visibility of pro-social behavior, potentially leading to additional adoption through social contagion effects.
Experimental design
There are two sources of exogenous variation in the study. Exogenous assignment to receive materials constitutes the first level of randomization. Households will first be assigned to either the control group (receiving no materials), treatment 1 (receiving materials with no incentive for displaying them), or treatment 2 (receiving materials with a financial incentive to display them). Within the treatment groups, half will receive a recruitment email that details the intervention to which they have been assigned, while half will receive a recruitment email that provides no information on the intervention (identical to the email sent to the consenting control group).
Design details
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