Peer effects, Rewards, and Image Concerns in Energy Decision (PRICED)

How to cite

Carattini, Stefano; Tavoni, Alessandro; Gosnell, Greer. 2019. "Peer effects, Rewards, and Image Concerns in Energy Decision (PRICED)." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003951. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3951-1.1

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Stefano Carattini* , Alessandro Tavoni , Greer Gosnell

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003951
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3951-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2019-02-27 – 2020-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93, D71, D83, Q21, Q54
Secondary IDs
OSF y6n3c
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3951

Abstract

We have partnered with a renewable energy provider to implement a field experimental study to test the effects of image concerns and financial incentives on the private adoption of renewable energy tariffs. To causally identify the effect of each intervention on behavior in the experiment, we will study the geographical distribution of customers and treat randomly selected defined geographical areas, ensuring that comparable areas are allocated across treatment and control groups. In the study proposed here, we will carefully select triplets comprised of three similar household clusters to each
receive one of the treatments. A first treatment will allow us determining the effect of social image (as defined in Benabou and Tirole, 2006) on green energy adoption and customer retention. By comparing with a second treatment, in which financial incentives are combined with social rewards, the effect of each of these two elements can be disentangled. Financial incentives may either reinforce (crowd in) or attenuate (crowd out) the effect of social rewards. Finally, the experimental design will allow us to determine the effects of the visibility of pro-social behavior on local peer adoption. Importantly, the study will allow us to generate exogenous variation in the visibility of pro-social behavior, potentially leading to additional adoption through social contagion effects.

Intervention

We have partnered with a renewable energy provider to implement a field experimental study to test the effects of image concerns and financial incentives on the private adoption of renewable energy tariffs. To causally identify the effect of each intervention on behavior in the experiment, we will study the geographical distribution of customers and treat randomly selected defined geographical areas, ensuring that comparable areas are allocated across treatment and control groups. In the study proposed here, we will carefully select triplets comprised of three similar household clusters to each receive one of the treatments. A first treatment will allow us determine the effect of social image (as defined in Benabou and Tirole, 2006) on green energy adoption and customer retention. By comparing with a second treatment, in which financial incentives are combined with social rewards, the effect of each of these two elements can be disentangled. Financial incentives may either reinforce (crowd in) or attenuate (crowd out) the effect of social rewards. Finally, the experimental design will allow us to determine the effects of the visibility of pro-social behavior on local peer adoption. Importantly, the study will allow us to generate exogenous variation in the visibility of pro-social behavior, potentially leading to additional adoption through social contagion effects.

Experimental design

There are two sources of exogenous variation in the study. Exogenous assignment to receive materials constitutes the first level of randomization. Households will first be assigned to either the control group (receiving no materials), treatment 1 (receiving materials with no incentive for displaying them), or treatment 2 (receiving materials with a financial incentive to display them). Within the treatment groups, half will receive a recruitment email that details the intervention to which they have been assigned, while half will receive a recruitment email that provides no information on the intervention (identical to the email sent to the consenting control group).

Design details

Randomization method
Stratified randomization (done in office by a computer).
Randomization unit
Postcode sector. Treatment assignment is defined at the postcode sector, hence all existing Good Energy customers (“seeds”) in a given postcode sector are assigned to the same treatment.
Clusters
Households within postcode sectors. 664 postcode sectors per treatment arm.
Observations
Upper bound at the total number of GoodEnergy customers (some 60,000). Consent is necessary to participate in the experiment and so the number of observations varies depending on the fraction of consenting individuals.
Arms
664 postcode sectors per treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
1. Intent to be part of the study as reported in the randomized consent elicitation process, as a function of the messaging received (control, treatment 1, treatment 2) 2. Self-reported use of signposts, and window clings, in treatment 1 (no financial incentive) compared to control (no intervention) 3. Difference in the self-reported use of signposts and stickers, between treatment 1 and treatment 2
Secondary outcomes
1. Compliance (conditional on having consented) in treatment 1, treatment 2, for the use of signposts and window clingers, as a function of the messaging received 2. Difference between observed compliance and stated compliance and between estimated compliance and stated compliance 3. Adoption by others as attributable to our interventions (social contagion) with aggregate data analysis at the level of randomization (control groups both with consent—and therefore access to energy data—and without) 4. Adoption by others as attributable to our interventions (social contagion) using household-specific data on referrals (referral code unique to households) 5. Adoption by others as attributable to our interventions (social contagion) as a function of the characteristics of the “seeds”, which in turn may be a function of the messaging received (as well as other characteristics that will be observed in the data) 6. Potential contamination and spillover effects that our localized intervention could not prevent; Hawthorne-like effects if the design may allow them to take place in the untreated (in principle) control group that provides consent

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords